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case of a noise or stench, common to a neighborhood: -Davisonv.
Isham, 9 N. J. Eq. (1 Stock.) 186 ; Oatlen v. Valentine, 9 Paige
575. But where the injury is not common to all, as where it consists in part of vibration produced by machinery, which affects the
buildings of some of the complainants, and not those of the rest
of them, there is a misjoinder of parties: -Davison v. Isham,
supra.
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The rule that a witness not an expert cannot testify as to his opinion is not of uni
versal application. Under certain circumstances such a witness may state his observation as to cause and effect.
Thus where the question was as to the discharge of water from a hose and its
effect upon a team of horses, a witness may state not only that the water was discharged, but that in his opinion it was this that frightened the horses.
Where an obstruction in the street is in plain view of the driver of a vehicle, and
he drives against itj he is guilty of contributory negligence, and it is no answer to
this to say that his attention was taken up with looking above the ground to direct
his team.

from Wapello District Court.
This action was brought to recover damages for an injury received by the plaintiff by being thrown from a wagon in one of the
streets of Ottumwa, the accident having been occasioned, as it is
alleged, by reason of one of the wheels of the wagon coming in
contact with a stone which the city authorities had negligently allowed to remain upon the street. The pleadings are in the usual
form of actions of this character, and a trial to a jury resulted in
a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
APPEAL

TWm. 3 eNutt and W. D. Tisdale, for appellant.
W. H. C. Jacques, S. -E. Alder and Stiles d Beaman, for
appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROTUROCK, J.-1. The plaihtiff and her husband, who is a farmer, reside in the vicinity of Ottumwa. On the morning of the
day the injury was received they went to Ottumwa, in an ordinary
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farm wagon, drawn by two horses, to sell some potatoes and purchase some family supplies. After selling the potatoes the plaintiff
went to another part of the city on an errand, and the husband
drove the wagon down along the edge of Jefferson street and left it
standing there awaiting plaintiff's return. When she returned they
put some chairs, which they had purchased, in the wagon, and the
plaintiff seated herself upon one of the chairs. Her husband took
his seat upon a board laid across the wagon box and started the
team. The wagon had moved but a few feet when the plaintiff fell
to the street, and by reason of the fall her arm was broken.
It was claimed upon the trial that the fall of the plaintiff was
caused by one of the wheels of the wagon coming in contact with a
stone in the street, in a violent and sudden manner, by which the
wagon careened or tipped to one side. There was a great variance
in the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiff, as to the size of
the stone and its exact location in the street. It was claimed, upon
the part of the city, that there was no stone in the street, and that
the wagon wheel did not run against a stone, but that the accident
was caused by a sudden start of the team from fright, the wagon
being partly in the gutter at the side of the street, and not upon
level ground, and for the further reason that the plaintiff was in an
unsafe and dangerous position, being seated in the wagon upon an
unfastened chair.
It is by no means clear from the evidence that there was a stone
in the street, such as is described by the plaintiff's witnesses. The
witnesses for the defendants, some of whom were in position to
know whereof they testified, stated that no such stone was in the
street at the time of the accident. Upon this question of fact the
court would not have been justified in interfering with a verdict for
either of the parties.
This being the state of the case, it was a most material question
whether or not there was any other cause to which the accident was
properly attributable than the contact with the stone on the street.
Mrs. E. Ulrich was called as a witness for the defendant. She
testified that she was sitting at an upper window, in a building
near where the accident occurred, with nothing to obstruct her
view of the wagon and the street where it stood. She further
testified as follows: "I saw the woman coming across Main street
from Hill's grocery; she had some chairs and packages in her
arms ; she put the chairs in the wagon and got in; she sat on a
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chair, back of the seat in the wagon. When the horses started to
go off she fell out. The horses started quick-kind of jumped. I
thought I saw a man standing there sprinkling the street with a
hose; he was standing on the sidewalk, at the edge of the building, sprinkling down the sidewalk towards the alley; he was
sprinkling water near the team, all around them ; he commenced
sprinkling just a little before the accident happened. She fell out
at the same time the horses jumped. The horses in starting gave
a quick motion. She fell out right over the sidewalk. Some
packages she had in her arms fell out with her. The chair did not
fall out."
Question. "Now I would like to have you state what it was that
made the horses jump." Objected to by the plaintiff because
incompetent, and it calls for a conclusion of the witness. The
objection Was sustained by the court, and the defendant duly
excepted to the ruling at the time.
Mrs. McGuire, another witness, stated that she was at the window with Mrs. Ulrich, and after describing the position of the
wagon and the plaintiff's position therein, she was asked this question: "You can describe, after she got in and sat down on the
chair, how the accident occurred, as you now remember it. Give
it in your own way-after she sat down." Answer. " There was
some one standing at those steps near the door sprinkling the
streets with a hose, and the water flew over the horses and around
them, and they got frightened and jumped." Objection was made
to "what the witness said about the horses becoming frightened,
because it is incompetent, being an opinion of the witness." The
objection was sustained. We think these rulings of the court were
erroneous. It is true that the dividing line between what is a fact
and what is an opinion, is not and cannot be very clearly defined;
but it surely is competent for a witness to state whether horses were
frightened by a stream of water thrown upon or around them, or
by the escape of steam from an engine, or by being set upon by a
dog, or the like.
The observation of the witness as to cause and effect is a fact
which he may state to the jury. Upon a question like this, the
discharge of the water from the hose and its effect upon the horses
appears to us to be a compound of fact and opinion. To hold that
it is incompetent would limit and hamper the introduction of evidence in a manner not contemplated by any rule of law of which
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we have any knowledge. If it be the law that a witness, not an
expert, may not, under any circumstances, give an opinion, the
statement of these witnesses that the horses were frightened would
not be admissible. But the rule is not thus to be applied. It is
competent for a witness to testify to his conclusion when the matter
to which the testimony relates cannot be reproduced or described
to the jury precisely as it appeared to the witness at the time. It
appears to us that the subject-matter-the alleged fright of the
horses, in this case-was of the character just described. A witness may see a team frightened and may state the fact that water
was thrown from a hose upon or near the team, and he may describe
how and when it was thrown, and yet he cannot put the jury in his
place in regard to the facts without stating his conclusion as to the
effect of the throwing of the water.
A witness may state his opinion in regard to sounds-their
character, from what they proceed, and the direction from which
they seem to come (State v. Shinborn, 46 N. H. 497) ; the correspondence between boot and foot prints (Com. v. Pope, 103 Mass.
440) ; and it is competent for a witness not an expert to testify
to the condition of health of a person, and that he is ill or disabled, or has a fever, or is destitute (Barker v. Coleman, 34 Ala.
221; Wilkinson v. Moseley, 30 Id. 562). A witness may give his
judgment whether a person was intoxicated at a given time:
-People v. Eastwood, 14 N. Y. 562; State v. Huxford, 47 Ia. 16.
2. The plaintiff and her husband both testified that the horses
were old and gentle, and they were not at all frightened. It is
pretty clearly established by the evidence that if there was a stone
in the street it was in plain view of the husband of the plaintiff
when he took his seat in the wagon and started the horses. The
court did not directly charge the jury that if the stone was in full
view of the plaintiff's husband he should have seen and avoided it.
The charge directs the jury that the driver was chargeable with
ordinary care and prudence in driving the team. It was not claimed
that the husband's attention was in any manner diverted from properly driving the team after he took his seat in the wagon. The
accident happened in broad daylight. Now, if the stone was in full
view of the husband when he started the team, it was his plain
duty to have seen and avoided it. The defendant requested the
court to instruct the jury that "it was the duty of the plaintiff's
hnsband to use care in driving, and to look where he was driving,
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and to avoid all obstacles which were dangerous in their character,
and which were plainly visible and not obscured, and if he failed to
do so, and the plaintiff was thereby injured, then she cannot
recover."
This instruction was refused. We think this or some other explicit instruction applicable to this view of the facts of the case
should have been given. Where an obstruction is in the street in
plain view of the driver of a vehicle, and his attention is in no
manner diverted so as to excuse him for not seeing the obstruction,
and he drives against it or into it, he is clearly guilty of contributing proximately to any injury which may result: Tuffree v. State
Centre, 11 IN. W. Rep. 1. It is no answer to this measure of diligence and care to argue that the driver's attention was taken up
with looking above the ground to direct his team. Human vision is
not so narrow that the driver of a team may not take in the whole
of his surroundings, including the team and every obstruction which
may be in the line of the wheels of his vehicle.
In our opinion the jury should have been expressly instructed
that if, when the team was started by the driver, the stone (if there'
was one) was in plain view, and there was nothing to divert his
attention from seeing it, that it was his duty to have seen and
avoided it, and, if he did not do so, the plaintiff could not recover.
Reversed.
As a general rule, witnesses must testify only to the facts which they have
witnessed, and not to the opinions which
they may have formed on those facts.
The exceptions to this rule are not many.
Perhaps the most important of these
exceptions is found in that portion of the
law of evidence which permits the opinions of experts to be heard on the trial.
Such opinions, however, are admissible
only on questions of science or skill, or
relating to some art or trade, and such
witnesses must have special skill, either
through study or experience, which will
enable them to answer questions which
the jury, uninstrueted in such matters,
would bc unable to answer. The rules
relating to the admissibility of such a
kind of evidence do not fall within the
purpose of this note, which will be restricted to a consideration of the rele-

vancy and competency of the opinions of
ordinary witnesses : that is to say, persons not professing special skill on the
subject, and therefore not properly falling within the definition of 1Cexperts."
In Clifford v. Richardson, 18 Vt. 626,
RoycE, J., in speaking on this subject,
said: " The general rule certainly is
that witnesses are to testify to facts, and
not to give their individual opinions.
This rule, however, has its exceptions,
some of which are as familiar and as
well settled as the-rule itself. When all
the pertinent facts can be sufficiently detailed and described, and when the triers
are supposed to be able to form correct
conclusions without the aid of opinion or
judgment from others, no exception to the
rule is allowed. But cases occur where
the affirmative of these propositions cannot be assumed. The facts are some-
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times incapable of being presented with
their proper force and significancy to any
but the observer himself. And it often
happens that the triers are not qualified
from experience in the ordinary affairs
of life duly to appreciate all the material facts when proved. Under these
circumstances, the opinions of witnesses
must of necessity be received." It will
be observed that the judge here refers to
the opinions of experts on questions of
science or skill where he speaks of cases
where the triers are "not qualified
from experience in the ordinary affairs
of life," to pass upon certain facts before them. But in the second class, viz.,
where the facts are "incapable of being
presented with their proper force and
significancy to any but the observer himself," the opinions of persons not experts are referred to. Such evidence is
generally said, and properly too, to be
admitted from necessity. In many cases
it is impossible to separate a description
of certain things which have taken place
in the presence of the witness, from an
opinion upon them. In other cases it
would be impossible to convey the information to the minds of the jury without the expression of an opinion.
The most common class of cases in
which the opinion of a non-expert is
permitted is that where questions of time,
quantity, number, dimension, height,
speed, distance, or the like, are at issue.
In Stewart v. State, 19 Ohio St. 302, the
prisoner was indicted for killing D., and
the question arose whether or not the
killing arose out of a sudden quarrel. A
spectator, who was called as a witness,
was asked whether the prisoner bad time
enough to get out of the way of deceased, and his answer'was held admissible. " It is true, as a general rule,"
said the court, "that the opinion of a
witness cannot be given, the witness relating the facts from which the jury form
their opinion. This rule, however, is
not universal. The fact here sought to
be proved, to wit, that the defendant
VOL. XXXI.-82

could not avoid the conflict, could not
be well proved to the jury by a statement of facts, the time occupied by the
deceased in passing from where he stood
to the defendant, a distance of only a
few feet, could hardly be stated with any
accuracy of measurement. The rapidity
of his motion could not be calculated so
as to convey any very definite idea of
his velocity. The particular position of
the defendant, in reference to surrounding objects, as well as the position of his
body at the time, were important items
in determining the fact whether he could
have got out of the way or not, and yet
it would be very difficult, perhaps impossible, to convey any very clear idea
to the jury in reference to these matters.
A variety of circumstances that could
only be perceived, but not detailed,
would constitute the aggregate from
which the opinion would be formed. The
person who had witnessed the transaction could alone, most probably, form
any idea on the subject that could be relied on with safety."
In State v. Polwell, 14 Kans. 105, on
the tiial for the larceny of a horse, the
fact that the prisoner's wagon had made
certain tracks was relevant. A witness,
who had examined the wagon, observed
its peculiarities, and measured the width
of the wheels, was allowed to testify
that, in his opinion, the prisoner's wagon
had made the track. "It is true," said
the court, "that, as a general rule, witnesses are not allowed to give their opinions to a jury; but there are exceptions.
In many cases theyare thebest evidence of
which the nature of the case will admit,
cases where nothing more than an opinion can be obtained.
Duration, distance, dimension, velocity, &c., are often
to be proved only by the opinion of witnesses, depending, as they do, on many
minute circumstances which cannot fully
be detailed by witnesses."
In a Vermont case, tried in 1867, the question
arose whether one T. lived in the town
of J. in the year 1829. A witness sixty-
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four years old, who had been acquainted
with T., was asked: "From your opportunities of knowing, as you have
stated them, do you think it possible for
T. to have lived in J. that year and you
not have known it?" and the witness
was allowed to answer: III should not
think it was." On appeal, this was held
proper. Said the court, " Where the
witness has had the means of personal
observation, and the facts and circamstances which lead the mind of a witness
to a conclusion are incapable of being
detailed and described so as to enable
anyone but the observer himself to form
an intelligent conclusion from tnem, the
witness is often allowed to add his opinion or the conclusion of his own mind.
Such is the case in questions of identity
of persons and things, handwriting,
the value of property, questions of insanity, time and distance, &c., and various other instances that might be referred to. It would be so difficult for
the witness to detail and describe all the
facts and circumstances in their full force
which go to make up his knowledge of
that T. lived in H. and not in J. that
season, as to bring this question and answer within the exception, and not within the rule that excludes opinions of
witnesses, if it can be regarded as an
opinion in the legal sense of the rule. It
is rather a mode of expressing the degree
of confidence the witness has in the fact
he affirmed as to the place of the residence of T. during the time in question.
It is like the case where two witnesses
are present at a conversation with a
third person, and one witness tstified
that a particular thing was said, and the
other is called and testified that he was
present all the time and heard no such
thing said. In such case, it is always
allowable for the latter witness, to state
whether, if any such thing had been said,
he thinks he should have heard it." In
another Vermont case, an action being
brought for injuries received on a highway, it appeared that there were several

holes and gullies in the road, which had
been made by water. The opinion of a
person who had examined them as to
whether they were of recent date, was
admitted. " Where the facts," said the
court, " are of such a character as to be
incapable of being presented with their
proper fdrce to anyone but the observer
himself, so as to enable the trier sto draw
a correct or intelligent conclusion from
them without the aid of the judgment or
opinion of the witness who had the benefit of personal observation, he is allowed,
to a certain extent, to add his conclusive
judgment or opinion :" Bates v. Town
of Sharon, 45 Vt. 474. So the question
being the speed as to which a railroad
train was going at a certain time, the
opinions of ordinary witnesses have been
admitted: Detroit, sc., RailroadCo. v.
Van Steinburg, 17 MIich. 99 ; Grand
Rapids, 6cc.,
Railroad Co. v. Huntley, 38
Mich. 537; Salterv. Utica, 4-c., Railroad
Co., 59 N. Y. 631 ; Pennsylvania Co. v.
Conlan, 101 Ill.
94. But where the question was the capacity of an engineto
draw a train, the opinion of an ordinary
witness was rejected: Sisson v. Cleveland, 6-c., Railroad Co., 14 Mich. 497.
These last cases illustrate the distinction
we have referred to. In Sisson's case
the question was one which none but an
expert could be supposed to have the capacity to answer; while, in the former
cases, as well said, " the point to which
the attention of the witnesses was directed was the speed of a passing object.
The motion of the train was to be compared to the motion of any other moving
thing, with a view to obtaining the judgment of the witness as to its velocity.
No question of science was involved beyond what would have been had the
passing object been a man or a horse. It
was not, therefore, a question for experts. Any intelligent man who had
been accustomed to observe moving objects would be able to express an opinion of some value upon it the first time
he ever saw a train in motion. The
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opinion might not be so accurate and reliable as that of one who had been accustomed to observe, with timepiece in
hand, the motion of an object of such
size and momentum ; but this would
only go to the weight of the testimony,
and not to its admissibility. Any man
possessing a knowledge of time and of
distances would be competent to express
an opinion on the subject."
Other illustrations of the competency
of opinion evidence appears in the following rulings: On an indictment for
murder, the opinion of a witness as to
the time of day the prisoner left a certain place, and as to the tirpe which
elapsed before his return, was admitted:
Campbellv. Sytate, 23 Ala. 44. So where
the question was whether a ballot-box
bad been tampered with, the opinion of
a witness who had seen it was admitted :
McIntosh v. Livingston, 41 Iowa 219.
So in an action for an injury on a highway, the question being whether It was
wide enough to permit two wagons to
pass each other, the opinion of a witness
who had examined it was admitted :
Fulsome v. Tsp. of Concord, 46 Vt. 135.
And see Kearney v.Farrell,28 Conn.319;
Francev. McElone, 1 Lans. 17; Evans v.
People, 12 Mich. 27 ; Couch v. Watson
Coal Co., 46 Iowa 7 ; Beatty v. Gilmore,
16 Penn. St. 463; Cook v. Parhsam, 24
Ala. 21.
A second class of cases where opinions
are admissible in evidence is where a
person's manner, habit or conduct or his
physical or mental condition or appearance are to be proved. In Tobin v. Shaw,
45 Me.331, A. sued B. for breach of promise of marriage. The opinion of a witness that after B. ceased visiting A. the
latter appeared sober and melancholy was
admitted. Said the court: "Certain affections of the mind, such as joy and grief,
hope and despondency, are often made
known to an intimate acquaintance without any verbal communications, by the
general appearance and conduct of the
party, with entire certainty, when the

facts on which conviction is founded in
the mind of an acquaintance cannot be
fully disclosed in language so as to be
understood by a stranger." JIcKee v.
Nlelson, 4 Cow. 355, decided in New
York in 1825, is generally regarded as
the leading case on this part of the subject. The action was for breach of promise of marriage, and on the trial witnesses were allowed to testify that in
their opinion the plaintiff was sincerely
attached to the defendant. On appeal,
this ruling was affirmed. "We do not
see," said the court, " how the various
facts, upon which an opinion of the plaintiff's attachment must be grounded, are
capable of specification, so as to leave it
like ordinary facts as a matter of inference
to the jury. It is true, as a general rule,
that witnesses are not allowed to give
their opinions to a jury ; but there are
exceptions, and we think this is one of
them. There are a thousand nameless
things indicating the existence and degree
of a tender passion which language cannot specify. The opinion of witnesses
on this subject must be derived from t
series of instances passing under their
observation, which yet they never could
detail to a jury." Although this case
has been criticised in Pennsylvania
(Leckey v. Bloser, 24 Penn St. 401),
and similar evidence was rejected in Indiana, in an early case, without any examination by the court of the question on
principle, the rulings of the New York
court appears perfectly correct, and has
been cited and approved in many subsequent cases in that and other states. An
earlier English case, not generally noticed
in the decision of such questions, is that
of Trelawney v. Colman, 2 Stark. 168.
This was an action for criminal conversation. It appeared that during the
plaintiff's absence from home his wife
had been visiting a friend, and another
visitor there was produced as a witness
and asked his opinion as to her affection for her husband during her stay
HoLnorD, J., ruled that the
there.
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judgment which the witness had formed
from the anxiety which the wife had expressed concerning her husband, and
from her mode of speaking of him during
her absence from him, was proper evidence. Lewis v. State, 49 Ala. 1, is
another instance of this kind. On a trial
for murder a witness testifying concerning the struggle between the deceased
and the prisoner deposed that the former
was trying to get away from the prisoner.
This was held competent. "It was
clearly not a mere opinion," said the
court, "but a fact derived from the observation of the witness, which it was
competent for him to state ; but if regarded rather as an opinion, than a fact
accurately speaking, it is such character
of opinion as may be stated by a person
who witnessed a conflict. A witness is
competent from observation to state whether a person appears to be sick or well
at a particular- time; and why may not
a witness, who sees a struggle between
parties, state whether one was trying to
get away and the other was trying to prevent his escape.
So in Brownell v. People, 38 lich.
732, the prisoner being indicted for killing a person in an affray, the opinions
of spectators that he appeared to be in
fear at the time, were admitted. Said
the court, " the manner in which an act
is done-whether rude and offensive or
kind and pleasant-is a matter of fact
open to the observation of the senses to
which a witness may legally testify.
Words are nothing except in connection
with the intention with which they are
used or taken. The animus of a look or
other expression of countenance is as
perceptible to the eye as words to the ear,
and often much more capable of correct
understanding. That this is so is selfevident.
In Polk v. State, 62 Ala. 237, the
question arose whether there was any ill
feeling between the defendant and
another at a certain time. The opinion
of one L. on this point was rejected.

On appeal this was held error. "1Enmity or ill-feeling between parties," said
the court, "is a fact to which a witness
may testify if he knows it. It is genererally made manifest by the demeanor
and conversation of the parties, and third
persons observant of and familiar with
their intercourse, and the state of their
feelings as shown by their conduct and
conversation may testify to it as a fact.
It stands in the category of health, sickness, good-humor, anger, earnestness,
jest.''
In a New York case B. being indicted
for the murder of i. during a struggle
between them, a witness was asked whether the hold of the prisoner and 1. was
His
a friendly or unfriendly grasp.
answer, that he thought it was a friendly
grasp, was received : Blake v. People, 73
N. Y. 586. So, in an action to recover
wages the opinion of a witness that the
plaintiff seemed to acquiesce in a proposal made to him (Bradley v. Salmon
Falls Mfg. Co., 30 N. H. 487) ; on a
trial for larceny the opinion of a witness
that when the prisoner made a certain
statement he did so in jest (Bay v. State,
50 Ala. 104); in an action for trespass
the opinion of a witness that the property
was seized in an offensive and insulting
manner (Raider v. Springer, 38 Ala.
703); on a trial for murder the opinions
of witnesses that the prisoner's manner
in answering a question was "short"
(Carroll v. State, 23 Ala. 28); in an
action for negligence the opinions of witnesses that the defendant's servants were
careful, temperate and attentive (Gahagan v. Boston, &c., Railroad Co., I Allen 197); in an action against a county
for medical services, the opinion of a
witness that the patient was in such destitute condition as to demand public charity and prompt attention (Autauga Co.v.
Davis, 32 Ala. 703); the question being
whether there was any ill-feeling between
two parties at a certain time, the opinions of witnesses on this point (Polk v.
State, 62 Ala. 237); on a prosecution
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under the liquor laws the opinions of witnesses that a certain party was a person
of intemperate habits (Smith v. State, 55
Ala. 1 ; Stanley v. State, 26 Id. 26 ;
Tatum v. State, 63 Id. 150) ; the validity of a sale alleged to have been made
to defraud creditors being disputed, the
opinions of witnesses that there seemed
to be a difference in the appearance and
management of the property after the
sale (Gallagher v. Williamson, 23 Cal.
331)-were all admitted in evidence.
And see Engles v. Marshall, 19 Cal.
320 ; Chaires v. Brady, 10 Fla. 133;
Snow v.Grace, 29 Ark. 138 ; Bryan v.
Walton, 20 Ga. 480; Wdttier v. Tsp.
of Franklin, 46 N. H. 23.
So, health, sickness and disease alleged
to exist at a certain time are provable by
opinion, as that a person "appeared
healthy," Brown v. Lester, Ga. Dec. 77,
or "appeared sick," Willdnson v.Mfoseley,
30 Ala. 562, or "looked bad," or "was
suffering," South, 4sc., Railroad Co. v.
M Lendon, 63 Ala. 266, or that his appearance indicated bad health, Rogers v.
Crain, 30 Tex. 224. And see State v.
Knapp, 45 N. H. 148, where the opinions
of witnesses were admitted that a woman's
health had not been near so good since a
certain time as before. In Irish v. Smith,
8 S. & R. 573, on a trial of a contested
will, a witness testified that the testator
would look at him with a vacant stare
and "his coquntenance and appearance
indicated childishness."
"The countenance," said the court," gives strong indications of the state of the mind. What
the countenance is, is matter of fact, depending, to be sure, in some measure, on
opinion. All men would not form the
same opinion of the same countenance.
One might think it indicated childishness,
another not. But that is no reason the
evidence should be excluded. The jury,
in such cases, must depend something on
the intelligence displayed by the witnesses, in the course of their examination.
Physicians are not the onlypersons capable of judging of the countenance. A

simple idiot no man could mistake ; nor
would there be much difficulty in perceiving very great weakness of intellect
short of pure idiocy."
In Chicago, 4-c., Railroad Co. v. George,
an action was brought against a railroad
company for a personal injury. The
opinion of an ordinary witness that the
plaintiff required medical attendance for
a certain time was held competent. Said
the court, " in a question of this kind
any person of intelligence is capable of
judging of the necessity of medical advice and services. It is universally
acted upon by all classes of mankind,
and we are not disposed to lay down a
rule that none but a physician is competent to prove that a person is sick or so
sick as to require medical advice. When
it comes to determhe the nature or the
effects of disease, it is different. These
are scientific questions that none but
those skilled in the science are competent
to determine.
And as well said by
CA-.PnrLL, J., in Elliott v. Van Buren,
33 Mlich. 49, " There is no rule which
can prevent ordinary witnesses from describing what they see or from testifying
concerning the kind of injury or sickness
of others whom they have had occasion
to consort with, unless it is something
out of the common course of general information and experience, or unless the
question presented involves medical
knowledge beyond that of ordinary unprofessional persons. It would be ridiculous to shut out testimony of what any
juryman would understand well enough
for all the exigencies of the case before
him, simply because no physician had
seen or examined the party. Itwould
lead to a denial of justice in all cases
of bodily injuries and sickness which
did not occur within range of.medical
help, and which were not regarded as
so difficult of treatment as to demand it.
There is no danger that the introduction
of common testimony on matters of
common knowledge will do any more
mischief when open to cross-examination
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before a court and jury, than would arise
from the want of any legal means of selecting witnesses from the numerous class
of professional men who differ as much
in their relative merits as many of them
do from laymen."
Age also is provable by opinion. For
example, on an indictment for selling
liquor to a minor the opinion of a witness that the minor's appearance was
calculated to produce the belief that he
had attained his majority is competent:
Marshallv. State, 49 Ala. 21. And the
plea of infancy being set up to an action
on a contract, the opinions of witnesses
that from his appearance they should
take the defendant to have been of legal
age at the time, are relevant: Morse v.
State, 6 Conn. 9 ; Benson v. McFadden,
50 lnd. 431.
Drunkenness alleged to exist in a person at a certain time is provable by opinion. In Dimick v. Downs, 82 Ill. 570,
in an action for assault and battery it
was contended that the plaintiff was intoxicated. The opinion of a witness to
this effect was admitted. "Whether a
person,'' said the court, '!is nervous and
excited or calm, or whether drunk or sober, are facts patent to the observation
of all, and their comprehension requires
no peculiar scientific knowledge. In
Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 424, on a trial
for murder the opinions of witnesses that
when they saw the prisoner, shortly after
the crime, "he appeared to be drinking" were received. Said the court, "It
would seem rather captious to object to
the statements of the witnesses that the
prisoner appeared to be drinking. Such
expressions, both in ordinary life and in
the courts, convey to the mind with sufficient certainty, the condition of a person, so as to enable one to pronounce a
decision therein with reasonable assurance of the truth. Really no other rule
is practicable; if the witness must be confined to a simple narration of facts, how
the person leered or grinned, how he
Winked his eyes or squinted, how he

wagged his head, &c., all of which
drunken men do, you shut out not only
the ordinary, but the best mode of obtaining truth."
In an Illinois case (City qf Aurora v.
66) it was said: "InHillman, 90 Ill.
toxication or drunkenness are facts which
maybe proven as other facts are proven.
A witness by observation and by the exercise of his perceptive faculties, ls five
senses, can learn and know facts, and
such facts he may state. He would not
be confined to a detail of the combination
of minute appearances that have enabled
him to ascertain the facts of intoxication.
The details of conduct, attitude, gesture,.
words, tone and expression ofeye and face
may be stated by him, or he may state the
fact of intoxication, a fact which he can
ascertain by personal observation, as he
ascertains other facts. So also a witness
may state whether or not a person had
the appearance of being intoxicated, and
such statement of appearance would be
the statement of a fact. Facts which are
latent in themselves and only discoverable by way of appearances, more or less
symptomatic of the existence of the main
fact, may from their very nature be shown
by the opinions of witnesses as to the
existence of such appearances or symptoms. Sanity, intoxication, the state of
health or of the affections, are facts of
this character. And see People v. Eastwood, 14 N. Y. 562; Sta(e v. ike, 49
N. H. 407 ; State v. Bluxford, 47 Iowa
16 ; Castner v. Sliter, 33 N. J. L. 96 ;
Pierce v. State, 53 Ga. 365 ; Pierce v.
Pierce, 38 Mlich. 412.
But by far the largest class of cases in
which evidence of opinion has been received is that where the sanity or insanity
of a person is at issue. As a general
and well-founded rule persons not medical men cannot give their opinions as to
the existence, nature or extent of disease.
An exception to this rule was early made
in the case of subscribing witnesses to a
will who are allowed to be called upon
for their'opinions as to the sanity of the
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testator at the time they executed it.
Afterwards, this exception was extended
and the rule established in England that
one not an expert may give an opinion
founded upon observation that a certain
person is sane or insane. This rule is
now adopted in the courts of all the
states except those of Massachusetts,
Maine, New Hampshire and Texas:
Morsev.Crowford, 17 Vt. 502; Clford
v. Richardson, 18 Vt. 620; Crane v.
Nort4/eld, 33 Id. 124; Dunham's Appeal, 27 Conn. 192; Clark v. Fisher, 1
Paige 171 ; Sears v. Shafer, 1 Barb.
408; Delafield v. Parish, 25 Id. 38;
Stewart v. Lispenard, 26 Wend. 308;
Trumbull v. Gibbons, 22 N. J. L. 136
Witenack v. Stryker, 2 N. J. Eq. 8;
Garrisonv. Garrison, 15 Id. 266; Irish v.
Smith, 8 S. & R. 573 (11 Am. Dec.
648); Grabill v. Barr, 5 Penn. St. 441
Brooke v. Townshend, 7 Gill 10; Dorsey
v. Warfield, 7 Mid. 65 ; Burton v. Scott,
3 Rand. 399; Heyward v. Hazard, 1
Bay 335; Potts v. Howe, 6 Ga. 324;
Wralker v. Walker, 14 Id. 242 ; Nhorrisv.

State, 16 Ala. 776 ; Powell v. State, 25
Id. 21 ; Kellyv. McGuire, 15 Ark. 557;
State v. Gardiner,Wright 392; Baldwin
v. State, 12 Mlo. 223 ; Doe v. Reagan, 5
Blackf. 217 ; State v. Pelter, 25 Iowa
67 ; White v. Bailey, 10 Mlich. 155;
Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. 0. C. 580;
Dennis v. Weekes, 51 Ga. 24 ; Dove v.
State, 3 Heisk. 348 ; Ins. Co. v. Rodel, 5
Otto 233; State v. Ketchey, 70 N. 0.
621 ; O'Brien v. People, 48 Barb. 275 ;
Deshon v. Merchants' Bank, 8 Bosw. 461;
State v. Haden, 51 Vt. 296 ; Fountain
v. Brown, 38 Ala. 72 ; Gardinerv. Gardiner, 34 N. Y. 155; Choicev. State, 31
Ga. 424; Haut v. Haut, 3 B. Mon. 577;
State v. .Erb, 74 Mlo. 199 ; Robinson v.
Adams, 62 Me. 369.
Evidence of opinion is admissible also
on another principle, viz., that the matters testified to are matters of common
and general knowledge. In Barnes v.
Ingalls, 39 Ala. 193, the question arose
as to whether a photograph had been

well executed. The opinions ofwitnesses
that certain photographs, executed for
them by the same person, were well executed, were admitted, although the witnesses did not claim to be experts or to
have any special knowledge on the subject. Said the court: " One of the
facts to which they testified was that certain portraits painted for them by the
plaintiff were faithful likenesses. A most
important requisite of a good portrait is
that it shall be a correct likeness of the
original; and although only experts may
be competent to decide whether it is well
executed in other respects, the question
whether a portrait is like the person for
whom it was intended, is one which it
requires no special skill in, or knowledge
of the art of painting to determine. The
immediate family of the person represented, or his most intimate friends, are
indeed, as a general rule, the best judges
as to whether the artist has succeeded in
achieving a faithful likeness. To eyes,
sharpened by constant and intimate association with the original, defects will be
visible, and points of resemblance will
appear which would escape the observation of the practical critics. We should
think the painter had finished the likeness of a mother very indifferently if it
did not bring home to her children traits
of undefinable expression, which had escaped every eye but those of familiar
affection. The fact of likeness or resemblance is one open to the observation of
the senses, and no peculiar skill is requisite to qualify one to testify to it. Evidence on such a question stands upon the
-same footing as evidence of handwriting,
the value of property, the identity of an
individual and the like, and we think
that the testimony of witnesses that pictures which the plaintiff, while in the defendant's employment, had executed for
them were good likenesses, was competent evidence in the case."
So in a Wisconsin case (Curtis v. CMcago, 4-c., B.RB. Co., 18 Wis. 312), the
question was as to the state of the weather

IEHOE V. KEHO.
on a certain day, pnd whether it was cold
enough to freeze vegetables contained in
a building. The opinion of an ordinary
witness was received. "It is true,"
said the court, "that, in general, witnesses are not allowed to give their opinions except upon questions of science,
trade and some others of the same nature,
and then they must be adepts. But upon
a matter of such common experience as
the state of the weather, whether cold
or warm, and the effects likely to be produced by it upon fruit or vegetables when
improperly exposed, we think the evidence savors more of facts than of conjecture, more of knowledge than of mere
opinion. It is like the opinion of experienced witnesses upon questions of
value, which is always allowable." And
see Ohio, 6-c., Railway Co. v. Irvin, 27

Ill. 179; Com. v. Tiothy, 8 Gray 480;
Greenfield v. People, 85 N. Y. 75. So
in Stone v. Frost, the opinions of ordinary witnesses were admitted on the
question whether certain plants were dead
when received, but were rejected on the
question as to what killed them. Said
the court : "The fact as to whether a
root or other vegetable substance is dead
or not is matter of such common observation and experience that ir does not
require an expert to testify in regard to
it. The same may be said in regard to
the question whether a dead grape root
has any marketable or other value. On
the question what had caused the killing
of the roots, the evidence was all given
by persons skilled in the matter, and was
properly received."
JoH D. LAwsoN.
St. Louis, Mo.

In the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.
KEHOE v. KEHOE.
The doctrine of the English courts as to superstitious uses has never been adopted
in this country and is inconsistent with the religious liberty guaranteed by our constitutions.
A deed of personal property was made a few weeks prior to the donor's decease
upon an oral trust that it should be devoted to the purpose of procuring masses to
be said for his soul. Upon a bill filed by the trustee against the legal representatives
of the donor to obtain the instructions of the court as to complainant's duty, Held,
that the trust was valid and should be performed.

B. T.

Clifford, for complainant.

A. Tripp, for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
TULEY, J.-Richard J. Kehoe files his bill to obtain the instruction of the court as to his duty as trustee in reference to certain

funds now remaining in his possession.
John W. Kehoe, a few weeks prior to his decease, made a deed

to complainant of certain personal property, upon oral directions
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or trusts, which were in substance, that the funds should be devoted
to the purpose of procuring masses to be said for the soul of the
said John W., and for the soul of his mother, now also deceased.
The complainant is ready to carry out the wishes of the donor,
but the defendants-who would take as legal representatives of the
deceased, if no such disposition thereof had been made-contend
that the trust is void because it is not wholly in writing ; and if it
is not void for that reason, that it is void because the funds were
given for a superstitious purpose or use.
The Statute of Frauds is relied upon to sustain the first objection,
but as that statute does not embrace trusts as to personal property,
but only as to realty, the point is not well taken.
As to the second point the defendants contend that as our state
has adopted the common law and statutes of England prior to 4th
year of James I., excepting certain specified statutes concerning
usury and frivolous suits (see Rev. Stat. ch. 28), the decisions
of the English courts based upon thestatute 1 Edward VI., holding that gifts or.devises for procuring masses, &c., are void, as
being for superstitious uses, will be followed by the courts of this
country.
Redfield, in his learned treatise on the law of wills, after stating
.the doctrine, as above, of the English courts, says : "We understand this to be the general view of the law in the American
states:" 2 Redfield, sect. 36, ch. 5, &c. ; Story's Eq., sect. 1168.
Other text writers take the opposite view, and hold that the
American courts should not follow the English courts in their
decisions as to what are superstitious uses : Perry on Trusts, sect.
715; Hill on Trustees, p. 455 n.; Williams Executors, p. 1055,.
note s.

No American decisions of courts of last resort have been cited
by any of the text writers, and the researches of counsel in this
case, as well as my own, have failed to find any.
How did this doctrine of superstitious uses originate, and upon
what is it founded ?
Two English statutes were passed about the period of the reformation, concerning the disposition of property for uses then considered superstitious. The first was that of 23 Henry VIII. [ch. 10],
A. D. 1532, which was about four years after the clergy had acknowledged Henry VIII. to be the supreme head on earth of the church,
which provided that all uses ther. after declared of land (except
VOL. )XI.-83
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leaseholds of twenty years) to the intent to have perpetual, or the
continual service of a priest, or other like uses, should be void, and
the other was 1st Edward VI., ch. 14, A. D. 1547, which declared
the king entitled to all real and certain specified personal property
theretofore disposed of for the perpetual finding of a priest or maintenance of any anniversary or orbit, or other like thing, or any light
or lamp at any church or chapel.
These statutes were passed at a very troubled period of English
history in religious matters. Henry VIII. had just severed the
connection between the English church and the Pope at Rome, and
had united to the kingly power that of the head of the church.
While these two statutes were aimed at the practices of the Catholic church, yet the Catholic who denied the supremacy of the
king as the head of the church, and the non-conformist, were alike
persecuted, not only by religious edicts, but by all the power that
parliament could exercise in favor of the newly-established church.
It will be noticed that there was no statute making dispositions
of personal property to such uses void; that while the 23d of Henry
VIII. was prospective, it only applied to assurances of land to
churches and chapels, and that the 1st Edward VI. was limited to
dispositions of property, real and personal, theretofore made.
Nevertheless, the English chancellors, many of the earlier of whom
were ecclesiastics, and the English judges, being always adherents
of the established church, and undoubtedly imbued with that religious feeling which had induced such legislation, easily found in the
absence of any express statute, what they termed "a public policy"
or "a policy of the law," which enabled them to declare absolutely
void all dispositions of property, whether real or personal, given or
devised for the uses specified in the two statutes-or for uses which
they deemed to come within the period of the statutes-such as
"legacies to priests to pray for the soul of the donor." "For the
bringing up of poor children in the Roman Catholic faith," &c. ;
Attorney- aeneralv. Powers, 1 B. & B. 145 ; West v. Slhuttleworth,
2 M. & K. 684; In re Blundell's Trust, 31 L. J. Eq. 52; Cary
v. Abbott, 7 Vesey 490; Rex v. Lady Portington,1 Sal. 162, i
4 Win. & Mary, 5 Russell 289.
When judges undertake to decide cases not upon the law, but
upon what they consider "public policy" or the "policy of the
law," they stand upon very slippery ground. This is strikingly
exemplified by the strange inconsistency of the English decisions
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as to what are superstitious uses, one vice-chancellor, upon the
ground of public policy, holding a devise for the purpose of aiding
in the publication and circulation of "Baxter's Call to the Unconverted," to be void because for a superstitious use; and Lord
ROMILLY holding, upon the like ground of public policy, a trust for
propagating the sacred writings of Joanna Southcote valid, and not
for a superstitious use, notwithstanding these writings averred that
Joanna Southcote was with child by the Holy Ghost: AttorneyGeneral v. Baxter, 1 Ver. 248; Thornton v. Howe, 31 Beav. 14.
The Irish chancery courts, uninfluenced by any consideration of
a "public policy" to oppose Catholicism, have not followed the
English courts, but have held, in two cases, bequests of personal property to procure masses to be said for the soul of the donor to be
valid: Bead v. lRodgens, Com. v. Walsh, 7 Irish Eq. R. 17, and
note.
The history of our statute adopting the common law and statutes
of England, and of the country at the time of its adoption, should
also be considered in determining whether or not the statutes 23
Henry VIII. and 1 Edward VI., ever became a part of our law;
and if they did whether or not the decisions of the English courts
as to superstitious uses should be followed in this country.
In May 1776 the people of Virginia assembled in a convention to sever the political relations that bound them to the mother
country. The celebrated bill of rights and constitution of the Commonwealth of Virginia was then adopted. The convention adopted
several ordinances deemed necessary to the changed relations, and
among others one adopting the common law and statutes of England prior to fourth year James I. The reason why that date was
fixed upon was, I presume, because in that year, 1607, the first
permanent settlement of Virginia was made, at Jamestown; the
theory being' that the colonists brought with them the common law
and statutes as it then existed.
"From the first the colonists of America claimed the benefit of
the common law. * * * The acts of parliament passed after the
settlement of a colony were not in force therein unless made so by
express words or by adoption :" Cooley Con. Lim. 23 and note.
Although the established chutch of England was by law that
of Virginia from its earliest colonial days, the same convention that
a dopted the oidinance also adopted a provision in the bill of rights
which declared "1that all men are equally entitled to the free exer-
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cise of religion according to the dictates of conscience, and that
it is the mutual duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love
and charity toward each other. It is apparent that the sentiment
of the convention was in favor of absolute freedom in religion.
The history of the colonies and of the then passing events teach us
that it was the sentiment and policy of the country. The war for
independence was raging and Catholic Maryland and Episcopal
Virginia were then fighting side by side the great battle for both
civil and religious liberty.
This statute (Revised Statute, ch. 26), was first adopted in 1807,
by the territory of Indiana, which then embraced the now states
of Illinois and Wisconsin. The northwestern territory, once a part
of Virginia, was largely settled by that people, and that fact probably is the reason why the Virginia statute was adopted. Illinois
was then an almost uninhabited wilderness, and the 23 Henry
VIII. and 1 Edward VI. could have no applicability. The present
statute was adopted in Illinois in 1819.
It may "upon authority" be contended that because of inapplicability and inconsistency with our institutions, the statutes referred
to, never became a part of our law: Note 1, Jarman on Wills 386;
Carter v. Baefour, 19 Ala. 814.
But even admitting that they did become by adoption a part of
our law, yet it must be conceded, considering the history of this
statute, adopting the statutes of England, and of contemporaneous
events in Virginia and Illinois, at the time of its passage, that
neither Virginia nor Illinois intended to adopt the doctrine of the
English courts as to superstitious uses as a part of their laws.
The question being freed from the force of "precedents" must
be decided upon principle. In the United States, where no discrimination is made in law between the professions of any particular religious creeds ; where there is an absolutely free toleration
of all religious opinions and modes of worship, can any such thing
as a superstitious use be said to exist ? Who is to decide whether
or not a use, as connected with the religious belief of the donor,
is or is not superstitious ? Must it be decided according to the sectarian views of the chancellor ?
Nor is the question here whether or not the doctrine of a purgatory is well or ill founded, or whether or not masses for the souls
of the departed are efficacious. Who can penetrate the life beyond
and say that there is no purgatory ? This property was appropri-
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ated by the donor to a use in accordance with his religious belief.
That there is a purgatory, and that masses for the souls therein
are efficacious, is a part of the belief of those professing the Catholic religion. In the formulary of faith of Pius IV., which is still
that of the unchangeable church, and which persons becoming members of the church are expected to give their adhesion to, I find the
following: "I profess likewise that in the mass there is offered to
God a true, proper and propitiatory sacrifice for the living and the
dead. * * * I firmly hold that there is a purgatory and that the
souls therein detained are helped by the suffrages of the faithful."
This being the donor's belief, why should not his desires be carried out? It has become a maxim of the law that a man may do
what he will vith his own. The only limitations are that he does
not violate the law in so doing, nor devote his property to an
immoral purpose. A person may gratify any whim or caprice,
religious or irreligious, that he may desire. With the wisdom of
his act the law has no concern. The legislature has not declared
such a disposition of this property illegal. Neither the legislature
nor the court has the power to declare that any religious use is a
superstitious use.
With us there is a legal equality of all sects, all are equally orthodox. To discriminate and slay what shall be considered a pious use,
and what a superstitious use, would be to infringe upon the constitutional guarantee of perfect freedom and equality of all religions.
The right of a person to devote his property to any purpose which
he believes to be a religious purpose, is just as necessary to the
religious liberty guaranteed by the constitution as is the right to
believe and worship according to the dictates of one's own conscience.
The wish of the donor must be followed, and the funds appropriated to the procuring of masses to be said in accordance with
his instructions.
We have read this case with great interest, both on account of the novelty, in
this country at least, of the question
involved, and because it was opposed to
our notions of the law upon the subject.
An attentive reading of the case and of
the authorities referred to by thL learned
judge who pronounced the opinion has,
however, convinced us of the correctness
of the decision. The contrary opinion,

it is true, is held in England : 1 Jarman
on Wills *205 ; 2 Redf. on Wills *495,
496, 497; 2 Perry on Trusts, sect. 715;
but, as has been well observed by Mr.
Perry, in the section of his work above
cited, "in this country, where all religious denominations, doctrines and forms
of worship are tolerated, or rather protected, so long as the public peace is not
disturbed, there can be no such thing as
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a superstitious use." So far as we can
learn, there is no other reported case in
this country upon the precise point involved in this case ; and, inasmuch as no
appeal has been taken, the case is worthy
of preservation, where it may be readily
accessible to the profession. The only
American cases that have been found that
bear upon the question are lethodist
Episcopal Church v. Remington, I Watts
218, 224r; M gill v. Brown, I Brightly
346, 373, note ; Gassv. Wilhite, 2 Dana
170, and the case of Gilman v. AllcArdle,
N. Y' Sup. Ct., not yet reported.' Rhymer's Appeal, 93 Penn. St. 142 ; Dougherty'sEstate, 5 Weekly Notes Cases 556,
though not bearing directly upon the
question, may be examined with profit.
111anners v. Phila. Lib. Co., 93 Penn. St.
165, is also an interesting case upon the
subject of religious toleration in the
courts of this country.
In the case of M. B. Church v. Remington, GmnsoN, C. J., observed that
"it is not easy to see how there can be
such a thing [as a superstitious use.
here, at least in the acceptation of the
word by the British courts who seemed
to have extended it to all uses which are
not subordinate to the interests and will
of the Established Church."
The case of a4gill v. Brown, supra,
was decided in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in April 1833, and involved the capacity of the Quaker societies to take real or personal estate by
devise without a charter of incorporation;
their right to enjoy it for their own use
as a body united for the purposes of religion, charity and education, and the
question what are by the law of the land
pious and charitable uses for which
valid donations can be made by deed or
will. In delivering his opinion BALDwi, J., said: "As to the 'statutes of
superstitious uses, it suffices to say, that
where there can be no religious estab-

lishments, no restraint on the free exercise of religion, and no preference of
modes of worship, the celebration of divine service according to the rites of any
church or society worshipping the Supreme Being, cannot be deemed unlawful
or superstitious."
In the case of Gass v. Wilhite, supra,
it was considered that the use created by
the covenant of the Shakers was not such
as would be held superstitious in England, and that there was nothing illegal
according to the laws of Kentucky in the
uses to which their property was devoted.
In delivering the opinion of the majority
of the court, NICHOLAS, J., said : "Time
use created by the trust of this society
would at no time since the reformation have been deemed a superstitious
use in England. For, though the courts
there disallowed trusts in favor of the
Catholic or Jewish religion, as inimical
to the established religion and settled policy of the government,yet trusts in favorof
dissenting Protestants have always been
sustained and enforced. With much less
reason, therefore, could it be denounced
here, as a superstitious use, where we
have no established religion, and where,
by our constitution, all religions are
viewed as equally orthodox. The recognition which religion generally has obtained from common consent and legislative enactments among us, as a valuable
portion of the institution of our society,
must prevent the courts from saying that
every religious use is a superstitious use,
and, by consequence, must compel them,
in fulfilment of the spirit of the constitution, to declare every religious use a
pious use. It is neither for the legislature
nor the judiciary in this state to discriminate and say what is a pious and what
a superstitious use. To do so would
necessarily infringe upon the great constitutional guaranty of a perfect freedom
and equality of all religions."
In Rhymer's Appeal, 93 Penn. St. 142,

1 Since reported in 16 Chicago Leg. News, p. 17.-ED.
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a testator, by a will executed within one

causa mortis, for the requisites of a gift

month of his death, left a bequest to a
church to be expended in masses for the
benefit and repose of his soul. The Act
of April 26th 1855, ]?amph. L. 332, prohibits devises or legacies for charitable or
religious uses, unless by will executed at
least one mouth before the death of the
testator, and it was accordingly held that
the bequest, being clearly for a religious
use, was therefore void according to the
express terms of the statute. See, also,
Dougherty's Estate, 5 Weekly Notes
Cases 556, in which the same question
was considered.
The case of Gilman v. MeArdle, decided in the month of July of the present
year, in the Superior Court of New York
1
city, and not yet reported, is an interesting case in this connection. Through the
courtesy of the learned judge who decided the case we have been furnished with
a copy of his opinion in the case from
which the facts appear to be as follows:
In 1882, Margaret Gilman, eighty-five
years old, placed $2300 in the hands of
Henry MleArdle, with the direction and
upon condition that lie should pay the
funeral expenses of herself and husband,
then ninety years old, when they should
die; erect a monument over their graves,
and expend the remainder of the money
in having masses said for the repose of
their souls. She died eight days later
and her husband about two'montbs afterwards.
Both died intestate. Michael
Gilman, as administrator, demanded that
MeArdle account and pay over to him
the money received from Mrs. Gilmore.
In delivering his opinion, FREDMAN,
J., after passing upon another point not
relating to the question now under consideration, said : "TThis brings me to the
consideration of the second question,viz.,
the validity or invalidity in law of the
disposition of the money made by Margaret Gilman. Such disposition constituted neither a gift inter vires, nor a gift

were wanting. There was no intention
of parting absolutely with the title and
control, but specific uses were enumerated to which, after the death of Mrs.
Gilman and her husband, the money was
to be appropriated. By such a disposition Mrs. Gilman sought to create a
trust for the uses specified:" The learned
judge, after stating the English doctrine
that this use would be held void as a
superstitious one, proceeds as follows :
"In the state of New York and in all
the states of the United States, where
there is no established state religion,
where all religious opinions are free, and
the right to exercise them is secured to
the people by constitutional guarantees,
there is no such statute [as 23 Henry
VIII., c. 10 ; and 1 Edw. VI. c. 14],
and no such policy, and I do not hesitate
to say that the doctrine of superstitious
uses, as enforced by the courts of Englapd, is against the spirit of our institutions and should not be adopted by our
courts. It is a fundamental principle of
our law that a man may do with his own
as he pleases, provided he does not violate the law nor devote his property to
an immoral use. Similar views have!
been expressed by Judge TunLEY of Chicage, in Ifehoe v. Kehoe, and by the surrogate of King's county, N. Y., in the
matter of the probate, &c., of the will of
Maria Hagenmeyer, deceased. In these
two cases, however, the question presented itself upon a testamentary disposition. The question of policy having
been disposed of, in so far as it rests upon
religious grounds, it remains to be seen
whether the trust sought to be created is
invalid for any reason known to law or
equity as administered in this country."
Upon tsis point of the case the court
came to the conclusion that "the trust
sought to be created'by Mrs. Gilman is
no trust at all known to law or equity,
because there is no beneficiary or ctstut

1 Since reported in Chicago Leg. News 17.-ED.
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que trust in existence or capable of coming into existence under the trust, and
.that, if for the reason stated the trust
fails, the disposition made of the money
cannot stand, because it amounted neither to a gift nor to a disposition by last
will and testament."
At a subsequent day upon a motion for
settlement of findings, &c., in order to
correct misapprehension as to the scope
of the opinion from which tie foregoing
quotations have been made, Judge
FREE DMAN, after reciting the English
and American doctrine, said: "If,
therefore, MNrs.Gilman had made a will
and bequeathed her money to her executor for the purpose of having masses
said for the repose of her soul or that of
her husband or both, or to a particular
church or priest for such purpose, I would
certainly have upheld the bequest, because under the testamentary disposition
the title would have passed. So, if in
her lifetime she had given the -money bsolutely to a particular church or priest,
with the request to have masses said, I
should not have hesitated to uphold the
gift, because the title would have passed.
So, if she had given the money to the
defendant in this action in such a way
that the title passed to him unconditionally and beyond recall, and merely requested him to have masses said, but left
it to him whether he would do it or not,
I would still have upheld the gift. Bat
she did none of these things. She attempted to create a trust by parol instructions and a bare delivery pursuant to
such instructions and yet to retain the
title to the money. The defendant, who
is an undertaker, was to have no interest
or benefit in it." In discussing the supposed trust the court then stated, as an
additional reason why it was no trust at

all, that there had been no gift or other
disposition by which the title passed, and
proceeded as follows : "It, therefore,
will be seen that the case really came
down to this: No title passed by either
a bequest or gift or legal trust. There
was only a mere naked deposit of money
into the hands of an agent, with certain
instructions concerning the employment
and payment from time to time of a
third person, namely, a Catholic priest,
for services to be rendered. In such a
case it is a fundamental principle of the
law of the state that the principal may at
any time revoke the instruction and recover his property, and that if he does
not do so in his lifetime and dies intestate, his death revokes the authority of
the agent, and that, as the title must go
somewhere, it goes to the administrator
of the estate. In such a case the character of the instructions is wholly immaterial. From the moment the administrator objects, the agent must cease paying
out. He can no more pay for the erec
tion of monuments than he can pay for
having masses said. But up to'that time
he will be protected for acts done in good
faith."
There is no conflict between this case
and the principal case, and it appears to
have been correctly decided. Indeed, in
none of the cases above cited was the
exact question discussed in the principal
case necessarily involved. The reasoning of the respective courts in these
cases (and so far as we know there are
in this country no cases holding the contrary position) would seem conclusive of
the positions taken by the court in the
principal case, the decision in whicl, we
are informed, is so convincing that no
appeal therefrom has been taken.
MAmsnALL D. EwELL.

Chicago.
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Supreme Court of Indiana.
PIPHER v. FOREDYCE.
Property in legal controversy cannot be seized by other judicial power than that
under which it came into custody of the law.
Property levied upon but replevied by parties claiming to be vendees of the judgment debtor cannot be again seized on execution, so long as the replevin suit is
undetermined.

FRom Daviess Circuit Court.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ELLIOT, J.-On the 20th day of November 1880, the appellees
were in possession of the personal property here in controversy
claiming to have acquired title through the Nelson Iron and Coal
Company. On that day an execution issued on a judgment rendered
against that corporation was levied on the property, and a writ of
replevin was sued out by the appellees, under which they obtained
possession of the property. Afterwards, and while the appellees were
in possession under writ of replevin and while the action of replevin was still undetermined, the appellant levied another execution issued against the coal company upon the same property.
It is the general rule that property in legal controversy cannot
be seized by other judicial process than that under which it came
into custody of the law. In Stout v. La Follette, 64 Ind. 365, the
general principle is recognised and enforced. The only inquiry,
therefore, is whether the principle can be deemed applicable to such
a case as the one under examination. The possession of the appellees secured to them by the undertaking given in the replevin
proceedings was, in legal contemplation, that of the law. Because
they, instead of the sheriff, were in actual possession, did not change
the character of the possession; they were in custody by virtue of
the process of the court and really as its agents. Of a similar case
the Supreme Court of the United States said: " On the giving of
the bond the property is placed in the possession of the claimant.
His custody is substituted for that of the sheriff. The property is
not withdrawn from the custody of the law: Haqan v. Lucas, 10
Pet. 400.
Where vendees of a judgment debtor obtain possession of property by virtue of a writ of replevin, and by this process take it
from the hands of the sheriff, it cannot, while the action of replevin
VOL. XXX.-84
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is pending undetermined, be again levied upon under another execution issued against the vendees.
This conclusion necessarily follows from the general principles
we have stated, for the denial of this conclusion involves the affirmance of the proposition that property in the custody of the law
may be seized under judicial process. The case of Mhines v.
-Phelps,3 Gilm. 455, is directly in point, and also are the cases of
Acker v. White, 25 Wend. 614; Shelleck v. Phelps, 11 Wis.
380. The text writers approve the doctrine: Hillard Remedies for
Torts (3d ed.) p. 51, sect. 29 ; Freeman Executions 135.
Judgment affirmed.
HOWE, J., did not take part in this decision.
Whether or not property can be attached or taken under an execution when
in custodia legis, there is scarcely any dissenting opinions of the courts; but the
chief difference in the cases is that in
some instances some courts consider the
property in controversy in the custody of
the law, while other courts, under the
same state of facts, do not consider it in
that condition. Then again peculiar and
local statutes have invaded the general
principles declared by courts as applicable to such property, and it does not
appear to what extent these statutes have
influenced the decisions.
Whatever principle exempts property
in custodia legis from the levy of an execution, also exempts the sache property
from the levy of a writ of attachment.
But the opposite conclusion must not be
resorted to, for the statute allowing an
attachment is not always as broad as the
statute designating what property may be
levied upon with an execution.
Air. Freeman, in giving the various
reasons urged why property in the hands
of a sheriff or constable is not subject to
the levy of an execution or writ of attachment, says: "1 [I] In some of the
cases the judges were satisfied to rest
their judgment on the general statement
that such moneys were in the custody of
law. [2] In other cases, it was urged

that money collected on execution does
not thereby become the property of the
plaintiff in the writ; that, in theory of
law, it is to be brought into court, and
by the order of the court paid over to the
person entitled thereto; [3] that the
officer, upon the receipt of such money,
does not thereby become the debtor of the
plaintiff; and finally [4], that it is not
until the money is paid over to the plaintiff that it becomes his property, and subject to execution against him. [5] It has
also been suggested, as amatter of public
policy, that the officers of the law, in the
discharge of their duties, should be protected from the hindrance and embarrassment consequent from holding money
and other property in their official custody, liable to levy and seizure in other
suits:" Freeman on Ex. 130.
See
Herman on Ex., sect. 246; Williams on
Ex. (6th Am. ed.) 2113.
Where the money is collected on an
execution the second and third reasons
for exempting it from seizure is certainly
not very sound. In that case the officer
is a trustee for the execution plaintiff and
is liable to the same extent as any trustee. In no case can he return the money
to the execution defendant. He must
pay the money to the execution plaintiff,
unless it is seized under a writ against
such plaintiff. But if he has seized the
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property of the execution defendant, then
such property belongs to him (the defendant) and the title to it is in him.
The levy under the second writ is made
upon property that does not belong to the
defendant in such writ; it is the taking
of one man's property to pay another's
debt. This, in theory of law, cannot be
done.
The first reason why such property is
exempt has its basis upon the general
assumption that no court will permit any
one to meddle with any property under
its control, for such intermeddling may
render its order or decree a nullity, by
taking away the subject-matter of that
order or decree, and, therefore, such intermeddling is punished as a contempt.
In the case of sheriffs and constables
where no return is required to be made
to the court of the proceedings on an
execution for its confirmation, this theory
is hardly applicable. In cases of receivers, executors, administrators, court
commissioners, and all officers compelled
to report to court, it has much weight in
its favor.
But it seems to us that the fifth reason is the true one. Such intermeddling
is against public policy. It hinders and
delays the officers in the execution of
their public duties, and subjects them to
such extra hazards as to deter many efficient men from taking upon themselves
the duties of those offices.
In speaking of an attempt to charge a
sheriff as trustee, Judge SEDWIK, in

Wildes v. Bailey, 3 Mon. 289, said: "I
confess that I should have been extremely
sorry to have found that the attempt to
charge the officer as the trustee of the
judgment creditor could have been supported. If it could, a principle would
have been established that an execution, wbich has been justly calledfinis et
fructus of legal pursuits, might be eterA judgment debtor
nally defeated.
would have nothing more to do, when he
had paid the money, than to engage a
friend who had, or who would pretend he

had, a demand against the creditor and
fix the money in the hands of the officer,
as long as there could be any pretence of
keeping alive the suit; and when that
could no longer be done a new action
might be instituted and the same consequence ensue, and so on ad infinitum.
This might be done independently by the
debtor merely to gratify revenge ; it
might be done by collusion between the
officer and the debtor; or it might be
done even by the officer alone, to secure
to himself the use of the money, which
from its amount might vastly overbalance
the trifling expense which he would incur.
It is true that an officer thus conducting
might be punished, if he were detected,
but he might not be detected ; and if lie
was detected his punishment would give
no satisfaction to the creditor for his
delay and vexation."
The Supreme Court of Kansas has said:
"When a sheriff has levied, a marshal
cannot touch, and vice versa; when a
sheriff has levied a constable cannot
touch, and vice versa, when a constable has levied, no other constable can
touch. The levy made must, in some
way, be carried out to completion, whether by sale of the property or by payment of the judgment before any legal
process can attach, because if the first
levy implies absolute and exclusive possession, there is nothing for the second
levy to touch. There is no provision of
statute for dividing the possession. The
first officer owes no duty to the second
officer ; none to the plaintiff in the last
judgment. If the process in his hands
is satisfied-and it may be satisfied before and without any sale-or if the plaintiff in the judgment directs the return of
the process, his duties are discharged,
save that the property unsold he must
return to the defendant. By no statute
is he required or authorized to hold it for
the benefit of any other constable, or the
plaintiff in any other judgment. The
defendant has a right to it by reason of
his ownership, and no statute casts any
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right upon the officer to retain possession property which is sought to be subjected
for the benefit of any other officer, or
to it, may not be levied upon'property in
will protect him against an action of the the hands of an officer of the court, undefendant for refusing to return it to him.
der certain circumstances. Of this class
It certainly would not be just for the sec- are Turner v. ,endall, 1 Cranell (S. C.)
ond officer to charge him with the respon117 ; Balter v. Kenworthy, 41 N. Y.
sibility of a second levy, when he can
215. But they go upon the ground that
take no possession, cannot interfere with
an execution directs the taking of the
the possession of the first officer, cannot goods and chattels of the defendant, and
know absolutely wheA thb possession will that money not yet paid over to him,
cease, and when the first officer owes no though he has the right to have payment
duty, for it would be casting upon him a of it, is not his goods, and so there can
responsibility without giving him the be no caption of it as such. But when
power of protecting himself, and throw- the process is also against a right to have
ing him upon the mercy of another offiproperty and may be executed against an
cer, who owes him no duty, and may have intangible right by giving notice of the
no desire to assist him :" Jones' Station- existence of the process, or by garnishery and Paper Co. v. Case, 26 Kans.
ment, as itis called, the reason of the rule
299; s.c. 40 Am. Rep. 310.
These
from the cases just cited, does not reviews are amply sustained by other cases:
main. It is not denied, I think, in that
Hagan v. Lucas, 10 Pet. 400; Brown class of cases, that if there exists such
v. Clarkce, 4 How. 4.
relation between the officer and the deIn New York an attachment was levied
fendant in the attachment suit, as that
upon $2000 held by the clerk of the court there is a credit, or the right of the latter
in lieu of an appeal bond, and on motion may be deemed effects of his, there may
to release the money the attachment was be a garnishment: Wilder v. Bailey, 3
sustained.
In the Court of Appeals,
Mass. 289-292 ; or if the money has been
FoLGEn, J., delivered the opinion, in his intrusted or deposited with the officer by
usual masterly manner, saying: "We
the attachment defendant: Id. Clearly,
may not deny that the appellant has nu- in the case before us, the defendant did
merous and respectable decisions, which deposit and intrust with the clerk its own
tend to sustain the views which he has
money, which remained its own money
urged upon us. From some of them we when the attachment order was served
will not differ.
They are those which upon the clerk; and that money alwayhold that a process out of one court to
has been the goods, credits and effects of
its officer uay not be served by a manual
the defendant, deposited in the hands of
interference with the possession of prothe clerk, and of which he is a trustee
perty in the custody of the officer of
of the defendant: Id. 294."1
another court by virtue of its process,
There is another class of cases.
such interference carried to the point of
They hold that a debt that has passed
the exclusion of the latter officer ; nor into judgment against the debtor may
may there be an interference which,
not be attached in his hands : Shinn v.
though it stops short of exclusion, claims Zimmerman, 3 Zab. 150. It is for the
and takes a joint possession of the proreason that the debtor is then liable to
perty. Of this class is Freeman v. Howe,
the execution on the judgment, and has
24 How. (U. 8.) 450. Neither may we
no chance to plead the levy of the attachdeny the soundness of other decisions to
ment; and if the latter be held good
the end that such process as an execution
against him he would be placed between
to a sheriff, which can be executed to
clashing peremptory processes from difeffect only by an actual caption of the ferent courts. It is not necessary to
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inquire whether this rule is applicable to
our processes of attachment, for it is not
involved in the facts of this case.
There is another class of cases which
comes nearer to that in hand. It is held
by them, in general terms, that money in
the hands of a public officer is not the
subject of attachment. In some of them
the decision is put upon the phrases of
the statute allowing the process (Chealy
v. Brewer, 7 Mass. 259), where the
words of the statute required an entrusting and deposit by the debtor with the
officer, which words are not in our code;
and if they were are met by the facts
of our case. Or the money was part of
a sum of public money, held by the officer forpublic purposes, the right to which
in the attachment debtor did not have the
character of a private claim against the
officer: Bulldeg v. .Eckert, 3 Penn. St.
368. It is not to be denied, however,
that a broader rule has been laid down;
that no person deriving his authority from
the law, and obliged to execute it according to the rules of law, can be charged
or garnisheed in respect of any money or
property held by him, in virtue of that
authority. See Drake on Attachments,
sect. 494, et seq., and cases cited. I
have examined enough of those cases to
perceive the rules laid down by them. In
all which I have read, however, there is
this to be noticed : That the money in
the hands of the officer of the law did
not go there directly from the debtor in
the attachment, but from some other and
original and independent source, over
which the attachment creditor had no
control as an owner: Coppel v. Smith,
4 T. IR. 313. In this there is a material
distinction from our case. Here the
money was the absolute property of the
attachment debtor, and always continued
to be its property, subject to the express
and unlimited right of the clerk over it,
conferred principally by the act of the
attachment debtor. As, when the right
of the clerk to withhold the whole or a
part of it ceased, that debtor could de

mand and have the whole or a part of it,
why, as above suggested, might not the
debtor have its right of proceeding
against the clerk; and, if so, why not
be able to transfer that right ; and, if so,
why may not the law transfer it? Even
in some of the cases above referred to,
there is a distinction taken which makes
for our view-as if money is collected by a
sheriff in excess of the needs of the execution, that excess is attachable : Pierce
v. Carlton, 12 Ill. 358 ; Lightnerv. Steinagel, 33 Id. 510. And the reason given
is that such excess is so much money in
the hands of the officer, had and received
for the use of the debtor in the execution.
The same reason applies here to any portion of the deposit with the clerk in excess of the amount needed to satisfy the
claim of Redfield. It is further said, that
if anything arises to change the relation
of the officer from an official obligation to
a personal liability, he will be amenable
to the process of garnishment. It will
bd seen further on, herein, that their
change was effected in the case in hand.
And it is to be seen on examination that
many of the reasons given against the
power to attach moneys, or the right to
moneys, in the hands of an officer, do not
apply to the case before us. In addition
to those already given is this : That it
would lead to litigation in one suit over
the effects in another; and would produce embarrassment and confusion to
permit one process to intercept money
raised on another, while in the hands of
the officer ; and that it might often lead
to injustice, inasmuch as often the names
of persons who had the real right to
money raised by process do not appear
upon the process by which the money was
got: Ross v. Clarke, I Dallas (Penn.)
355; Crane v. Freese, I Harrison (N. J.)
305. Yet, notwithstanding this, in the
case last cited, it was held that the attachment was well levied on the rights
and credits of the attachment debtor in
the hands of the sheriff, and a feasible
way was pointed out of avoiding the dif-
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ficulties spoken of, viz. : " For the officer

toms of London, H.

to bring the money into court, which can
control the application of the funds. In
the case in hand the money is already in
court, susceptible of the treatment indicated :" Dunlop v. Patterson Fire Ins.
Co., 74 N. Y. 145, affirming the same
case reported in 12 Hun 627.
Those who desire to pursue the subject
further will find the question discussed in
the cases cited below. It suffices to add
here that all the cases cannot be reconciled with each other.

Court of the United States, at an early
day, decided that money collected by an
officer is not, while in his hands, the property of the creditor, and of course not
liable to attachment : Turner v. Fendall,
1 Crunch 117; see Sharp v. Clark, 2
Mass. 91 ; Penniman v. Ruggles, 6 Id.
166; Staples v. Staples, 4 Grecnl. 532;
I Leonard 30, 264; .Firstv. Miller, I
Ohio 134; Farmers' Bank v. Beaston, 7
Gill. & J. 421 , Overton v. Bill, I
Murph. (N. C.) 47; Blair v. Cantey,
2 Spear (S. C.) 34; Jones v. J.ones, 1
Bland (MId.) 443; Burrell v. Letson, 2

R a Evix.-The principal case finds
support in Ackerv. White, 25 Wend. 614.
It was there decided that property levied upon and seized by virtue of an
execution, and then delivered upon a writ
of replevin to a "third person," could
not subsequently be levied upon by virtue
of another writ against the defendant in
the first execution, although the property
be permitted by the plaintiff in replevin
to continue in his possession and occupation. Until the claim under the first execution is disposed of, a second levy cannot
be made: Goodheart v. Bowen, 2 Bradwell's App. 578.
SEnisr.-So a sheriff having collected money upon an execution not yet
returnable, and of whom the money has
not been demanded, it has been decided,
cannot be held as trustee of the judgment
creditor on process of attachment, because the money was neither goods nor
effects of the creditor, nor was it a credit
in the hands of an officer; nor was it
money intrustedand deposited in the hands
of another within the meaning of those
words as used in the statute: Wilder v.Bailey, 3 Mass. 289. In the early case ofBensonet ux. v. Flower,Cro.Car. 166, 176, it
was decided that money in the hands of a
sheriff was in the custody of the law and
could not be taken from him by process
of law. This case is applied to chattels
in Farrv. Newman, 4 T. R. 651.
Such
is the general rule in England: Com.
Dig., Attachment D; Bac. Abr., Cus-

So the Supreme

Spear (S. C.) 378 ; I Strob. 279 ; Zurcher v. 1llagee, 2 Ala. 253; Drane v.
MeGavock-, 7 Humph. 132 ; .Pauley v.
Gains, 1 Tenn. 208; Clymer v. Willis,
3 Cal. 363; Hill v. La Crosse 4- .31.
Railroad Co., 14 Wis. 291 ; nor levy of
an execution : Reddick v. Smith, 3
Scam. 451 : Handy v. Dobbin, 12 Johns.
220; Williams v. Rogers, 5 Id. 167;
Prentiss v. Bliss, 4 Vt. 513; s. c. 24
Am. Dec. 631 ; contra, W1oodbridge v.
Morse, 5 N. H. 519 ; Conant v. Bicknell,
1 D. Chip. 50 ; Hfurlburt v. Hickls, 17
Vt. 193; Crane v. Freese, 1 Harrison
(N. J.) 305 ; Stebbins v. Peeler, 29 Ft.
289 ; Lovejoy v. Lee, 35 Vt. 430; Dolby
v. Mullins, 3 Humph. 437 ; Hill v.
Beach, 1 Beasley 31.
Where the money in his hands has,
however, ceased to be in his custody as
an officer, it is liable to attachment:
Watson v. Todd, 5 Mass. 271 ; King v.
M3oore, 6 Ala. 160; Davidson v. Clayland, 1 H. & J. 546; Tuckerv. Atkinson,
I Humph. 300; Jaquett v. Palmer, 2
Harr. (Del.) 144; Heara v. Crutcher, 4
Yerg. 461 ; Wheeler v. Smith, 11 Barb.
345 ; Pierce v. Carleton, 12 Ill. 358 ;
Didinson v. Palmer, 2 Rich. Eq. (S. C.)
407 ; Cole v. Wooster, 2 Conn. 203; as
where money is held by the officer after
he has gone out of office: Robertson v.
Beal, 10 Md. 125. This rule applies to the
receiptor of the goods : Cole v. Wooster,
supra; or to a sheriff where he is to pay
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the money to the plaintiff instead of
bringing it into court: New Haven Saw
.Mill Co. v. Fowler, 28 Conn. 103; nor
can the sheriff apply money collected on
one execution to the satisfaction of
another execution held at the same time
against the first judgment creditor, unless he consent to it. Such money is in
the custody of the law and cannot be
diverted from the course laid down for it
by the law: Thompson v. Brown, 17
Pick. 462; Dawson v. Holcombe, 1 Ohio
134 ; illuscott v. Woolworth, 14 How. Pr.
477 (reversing same case decided at special term, 13 Id. 336) ; Baker v. Kenworthy, 41 N. Y. 215 ; Hardy v. Tilton,
68 Me. 195 ; s. c. 28 Am. Rep. 34;
State v. Taylor, 56 Mo. 492 ; B x parte
Fiearle, 15 Id. 467 ; Prentissv. Bliss, 4
Vt. 513 ; s. c. 24 Am. Dec. 631 ; Armistead v. Philpot, 1 Doug.231 ; Winton
v. State, 4 Ind. 321 ; Wood v. Wood, 4
Ad. & E. (N. S.) 397 ; contra, Dolbyv.
Mullim, 3 Humph. 437 ; s. c. 39 Am.
Dec. 180.
It is further said that the specific money
belongs to the sheriff, and the defendant
has no leviable interest in it, and such is
the rule in the above cases : Turner v.
Fendall, I Cranch 117.
A levy upon money in the hands of an
officer, being void, does not prevent a
second levy on the defendant's goods and
chattels : Dubois v. Dubois, 6 Cow. 494;
s. c. 2 Wend. 416; Miller v. Adsit, 16
Id. 363.
But the New York cases cited have
been practically overruled, and in Wehle
v. Conner, 83 N. Y. 231, itwas held that
judgment debts and moneys collected on
exdcution by and in the hands of a sheriff are liable to attachment under process
issued in an action against the judgment
creditor; nor is this right affected by the
fact that the judgment debtor is also the
attaching creditor. It was further held
that where the property of an attachment
debtor is already in the hands of the
sheriff to whom the attachment is issued,
no formal levy or notice is necessary to

subject it to the lien of the attachment:
Dunlop v. Patterson Fire Ins. Co., 74
N. Y. 145 ; contra, M31asters v. Stanley,
4Jur. 28 ; s. c. 8D.P. 0. 169; Harrison
v. Painter, 4 Jur. 488 ; s. C. 6 M. & W.
387 ; 8 D. P. 0. 349.
Where, however, the sheriff collects
more money than is necessary to satisfy
an execution (as sometimes must necessarily happen), the excess may be garnisheed: Pierce v. Carleton, 12 Ill. 358;
Lihtner v. Steinagel, 33 Id. 510 ; see
Dunlop v. Patterson Fire Ins. Co., 74
N. Y. 152; s. c. 12 Hun 627 ; 30 Am.
Rep. 283; Orr v. AtcBryde, 2 Car. L.
Rep. 257; Lynch v. Hanahan, 9 Rich.
(S. 0.) 186; Payne v. Billingham, 10
Iowa 360; Hamilton v. Ward, 4 Tax.
356; Jacquett v. Palmer, 2 Harr.(Del.)
144; Wheeler v. Smith, 11 Barb. 345 ;
Hlearn v. Crutcher, 4 Yerg. 461 ; contra,
Fieldhouse v. Croft, 4 East 510 ; Willows v. Ball, 2 B. & P. (N. R.) 376;
Bentley v. Clegg, 3 Pa. L. Jr. 62; Crossen v. McAllister, 2 Id. 199 ; Harrisonv.
Paynter, 6 M. & W. 387 ; Fretz v. Heller, 2 W. & S. 397 ; Oriental Bank v.
Grant, 1 W. & W. L. 16 (Vict.).
In Pollard v. Ross, 5 Mass. 319, it is
said that the sheriff cannot be held as a
trustee of the judgment creditor until
after demand made upon him by the
creditor.
Personal property under a levy on an
execution is in custodia legis and cannot
be levied upon subsequently on another
execution from any other court; Tones'
Stationery and Paper Co. v. Case, 26
Kans. 299 ; s. o. 40 Am. Rep. 310;
(Benson v. Berry, 55 Barb. 620, denied);
Turner v. Fendall, I Cranch 133; Armistead v. Plhilpot, Doug. 231 ; Willows
v. Ball, 2 New R. 376; Heldhouse v.
Croft, 4 East 510 ; Knight v. Criddle, 9
Id. 48 ; Stratford v. Twynam, Jac. Rep.
418; Jones v. Jones, 1 Bland Ch. 443;
s. c. 18 Am. Dec. 327.
So a deputy sheriff cannot make a valid
attachment of chattels already attached
by another deputy of the same sheriff,
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even though the value be more than sufficient to satisfy the first attachment : Vinton v. Bradbrd, 13 Mass. 113; s. o. 7
Am. Dec. 119. This was upon the ground
that the second deputy could not take the
goods out of the possession of the first
deputy, and until possession could be
taken there could be no valid levy.
Cited and the doctrine approved in Bagleg v. White, 4 Prck. 397; Wheeler v.
Bacon, 4 Gray 551 ; Robinson v. Ensign,
6 Id. 302, 305 ; Odiorne v. Colley, 2 N.
H. 66; s. c. 9 Am. Dec. 39 ; Walker v.
Foxcrojt, 2 Me. 270. See, also, Burroughs v. Wright, 16 Vt. 619 ; West River
Bank v. Gorham, 38 Id. 649 ; Moore v.
Graves, 3 N. H. 408; Beers v. Place,
36 Conn. 578; Strout v. Bradbury, 5
Me. 313; Oldham v. Scrivener, 3 B. Mon.
579 ; H rbison v. McCartney, 1 Grant
474.
So one deputy sheriff may sue another
deputy of the same office in trover for
attaching and removing property which
the plaintiff holds under a prior attachment writ- Thompson v. Marsh, 14 Mass.
269; Draper v. Arnold, 12 Id. 449 ; or
he may even sue the sheriff himself for
the tort of another deputy in taking such
property on another writ: Robinson v.
Ensign, 6 Gray 302.
In Cresson v. Stout, 17 Johns. 116;
s. a. 8 Am. Dec. 373, it was held that
if a levy is made on goods under one
executioL, and a second execution is issued to the same officer, the levy is sufficient for both, and the goods may be sold
under the second execution as well as the
first: Leach v. Pine, 41 Ill. 65 ; State
v. Doan, 39 Mo. 44; Van Winkle v.
Udall, 1 Hill 559 ; Slade v. Van Vechten, 11 Paige 21.
If an officer has the funds received by
him on execution attached, there is no
doubt that he may pay the money into
court, notifying the parties of his intention so to do, and thus release himself
from any further liability : Stebbins v.
Walker, 2 Gr. L. 90 ; s. a. 25 Am. Dec.
499; Crane v. Freese, 1 Har. (N. J.)

306 ; see Williamson v. Johnston, 7 Halst.
86; Sterling v. Van Cleve, Id. 285;
Van Nest v. Yeomans, 1 Wend. 87; Ball
v. Bgers, 3 Cal. 84.
In the case of Stebbins v. Walker, it
was said : "It would seem to be taking
broad ground to deny to the court the
power of compelling a sheriff to bring
the money he has raised on execution into
court. This would be to deny to the court
the right and power to compel obedience
to the express command of their own
writ ; for by the execution the sheriff is
commanded to have the money in court
on a certain day, to render to the plaintiff for his debt or damages, and costs.
And so imperative was this command
formerly considered, that Lord Ch. Baron
GILBERT, in his law of executions, p. 16,
says: I No payment to the party will
discharge the sheriff's power by the writ;
because he is commanded by the writ to
have the money in court, then publicly to
pay the party, which cannot be superseded by any private agreement between
the parties.' And he afterwards adds':
'If the sheriff levy the money on the defendant, and delivers it to the plaintiff,
unless it be paid into court, the plaintiff
has his choice of a new execution, or of
a distringas, 4-c., against the sheriff.'
This strictness was afterwards relaxed,
and it was held that the sheriff might
pay the money to the party: Rex v.
Bird, 2 Show. 87; Fulwood's Case, 4
Co. 64 ; Hoe's Case, 5 Id. 90 a; 3 Bac.
Abr., tit. Execution, 710. But whenever
the practice commenced, of permitting
the sheriff to pay over the money directly
to the plaintiff, it was a permissive departure from command of the writ: 3
Bac. Abr., tit. Execution, 716 ; 3 Lev.
203, 204 ; Turner v. Fendall, 1 Cranch
117, &c. And however convenient it
may be in practice, yet it is not difficult
to discern the wisdom of the old rule,
which required the money to be brought
into court, and ' publicly paid to the
party.' The satisfaction of the judgment
thereby becomes matter of record, and
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put an end to further dispute on the subject."
Money paid to the sheriff to redeem
land that had been sold on execution,
was held exempt from seizure until it was
accepted by the holder: Davis v. Seymour, 16 Minn. 210 ; see Lightner v.
Steinagel, 33 Ill. 513.
COSTnAnL.-The rule applicable to

sheriffs is applicable to constables to
the same extent. The money in their
hands cannot be garnisheed: Burleson v.
MAilan, 56 Miss. 399.
But where a constable received an attachment writ subsequent to his receipt
of an execution, it was held that he might
apply the surplus left, after satisfying the
execution, to the attachment writ, it having in the meantime been sustained :
Wheeler v. Smith, 11 Barb. 345 ; ITitliauns v. Rogers, 5 Johns. 163.
And if the sheriff takes the property
from him by virtue of a subsequent lien,
he is liable to the constable for enough to
pay off the latter's execution, if that
much was realized: Betts v. Hoyt, 19
Barb. 412. Nor can the constable take
the property from the sheriff: Sepnour v.
lNewton, 17 Hun 30.
CLERK.-SO money in the hands of a

clerk on a judgment is in custodia legis,
and cannot be attached: Ross v. Clarke,
1 Dall. 354; Alston v. Clay, 2 Hayw.
(N. 0.) 171; Sibert v. Bumphries, 4 Ind.
481 ; JfurrelI v. Johnson, 3 Hill (S. C.)
12 ; Bowden v. Schatzell, Bailey Eq. 360;
Overton v. Hill, I Murph. 47. So money
in his possession in any manner in virtue
of his office is not attachable : Hunt v.
Stevens, 3 Ired. 365; Drane v. McGavock, 7 Humph. 132 ; Ross v. Clarke, 1
Dall. 354.
After an order of the court is made to
pay over the money to the parties entitled to it, it has been held in North Carolina as not exempt: Gaitherv. Ballew,
4 Jones 488. But the judgment in no
ease can be attached : DalvI v. Cunningham, 3 La. Ann. 55 ; nor seized : Hanna
VOL. XXXI.-85

v. Bry, 5 Id. 651 ; the only way is to
summon the judgment debtor as garnishee.
Where, however, money is paid to
the clerk to secure the payment of costs,
at the commencement of the suit, and
which in the event the costs are made
off the defendant is to be returned to
the party paying it to the clerk, such
money may be attached contingently in an
action againstthe paying party, for it is
the money of the one paying it in until the
contingency (failure to make the costs off
the principal defendant) arises that makes
it the property of another: Dunlop v.
Patterson FireIns. Co., 74 N. Y. 145.
OF THE PF.EAcE.-When
JUSTIc
money is paid to a justice of the peace
by a constable who has collected it uport
execution, it cannot be attached : Corbya
v. Bollman, 4 W. & S. 342 (Clark v.
Boggs, 6 Ala. 809, is decided to thecontrary, but upon a statute peculiar to the
state of Alabama); Hooks v. York, 4
Ind. 636.
Co31Isstoe.-So money in the
hands of a commissioner who has sold
property under an order of court is in
the custody of the law, and exempt from
garnishment: Thayer v. Tyler, 5 Allen
94.
MASTER IN CHANCEsY.-Money in
the hands of a master in chancery, being
the proceeds of the sale of land in a partition suit, which, by final order of the
court had been directed to be paid over
to one of the parties to the suit, as belonging to him, may be attached by the
creditors of such party : Weaver v. Davis, 47 Ill. 235. This was upon the
ground that his liability was changed
from an official to one of personal liability, and consequently lie was liable to
the process: MlfcKenzie v. Noble, 13 Rich.
(S. 0.) 147.

T4uSTEEs.-The property held by a
trustee appointed by the court is also exempt from levy with an execution or writ
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Yet in Alabama it was held that the
of attachment: Bentey v. Shrieve, 4
Md. Ch. Dec. 412 ; Cockey v. Leister, surplus remaining in his hands, where he
12 Md. 124. But the court of M~aryland was appointed to make sale of mortgaged
has said: "We do not, however, under- property to satisfy the mortgage, was not
stand from these cases that an attachment exempt from attachment: Langdon v.
cannot be issued and laid in the hands of Lockett, 6 Ala. 727; T'an Riswick v.
the trustee before a final account, and Lumon, 2 Mae Arthur 172.
And after an order of distribution the
that it would not be effective upon a sum
ascertained by such an account to be the distributive share of a particular creditor
distributive share of the debtor in the may be seized : Weaver v. Davis, 47 Ill.
attachment ; but that the process, before 235 ; Williams v. Jones, 38 Md. 555.
It has been decided that land held by
the account is stated, cannot affect the
fund or the trustee, or compel any modi- a receiver may be sold subject to the refication of the final account, for the ben- ceiver's right and the result of the suit
efit of the attaching creditor :" McPher- in which he is appointed: Edwards v.
son v. Snowden, 19 Md.197 ; sec Groom6 Norton, 55 Tex. 405 (but not money,
Taylor v. Gillean, 23 Id. 508).
v. Lewis, 23 Id. 137.
But the general rule is that the proRECEIvERs.-So money in the hands perty in the hands of a receiver cannot
of a receiver appointed by the court is in be touched by the execution officer:
custody of the law : ColumbianBook Co.
Wiswall v. Sampson, 14 How. 52 ; Gouv. De Golyer, 115 Mass. 67 ; Martin v. verneur v. Warner, 2 Sandf. 624; RobDavis, 21 Iowa 535 ; Glenn v. Gill, 2 inson v. A. 6- G. Railroad Co., 66 Penn.
Md. I ; County of Yuba v. Adams. 7 Cal.
St. 160. Contra, Adams v. Poods, 9 Cal.
35; Adams v. Haskell, 6 Id. 113 ; ve- 24; s.c. 8Id. 152; 15 Id. 207; 18Id.
lyn v. Lewis, 3 Hare 472 ; s. c. 5 Mod.
30; 21 Id. 165. A levy upon such pro496 ; Noe v.Gibson, 7 Paige 513; Rus- perty is a contempt of court, and the
sell v. EastAnglian Railroad Co., 3 MeN. court may order the levy released : Coe
& G. 104; contra, if the process does not v. Columbus, 6-c., Railroad Co., 10 Ohio
tend to disturb his right : Phelan v. Gan- St. 403; Russell v. East Anglian By.
ebin, 5 Col. 14.
Co., 3 MeN.& G. 104; s.c. 6 1. W.
But money in the hands of a receiver Cas. 501-522.
appointed in another state is not in cusThis is true even though the receiver
todia legis. Folgerv. Columbian Ins. Co., refuse to act: Skinner v. Maxwell, 68
99 Mass. 267 ; nor if attached before the N. C. 400 ; or has not reduced the proreceiver is appointed: Hubbardv. 17am- perty to possession: Ragedon v. Bank
ilton Bank, 7 Met. 340.
of Wisconsin, I Pin. (Wis.) 61.
Nor can a creditor of a creditor reach
AssI GEE.-So, money in the hands
the funds due the latter which are in the
hands of a receiver. Such a proceeding of an assignee is in the custody of the
would have a tendency to retard the ad- law, and cannot be attached: Colby v.
ministration of justice: Colmnonwealthv. Coates, 6 Cush. 558 (this, however,
Hide and Leather Ins. Co., 119 Mass. does not prevent the bringing of a suit,
after demand, against the assignee by the
155.
It has been held that money in his creditor, who is entitled to a dividend :
bands cannot be attached even after the Carney v. Dewing, 10 Cush. 498); M'assuit in which he was appointed has ter- sachusetts National Bank v. Bullock, 120
Mass. 86 ; nor is property: Schlueter v.
minated: Field v. Jones, 11 Geo. 413;
Raymond, 7 Neb. 281.
Nielson v. Conner, 6 Rob. (La.) 339;
This is true even though the money is
Voerhees v. Sessions, 34 Mich. 99.
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received by the assignee in compromise
of a claim to real estate alleged to have
been fraudulently conveyed by the debtor,
and was not accounted for by the assignee to the commissioners of insolvency, but is paid over to the creditors
pro rata, without any order from the
commissioner: Dewinq v. Wentworth, 11
Cash. 499.
And the general rule is that such
money cannot be reached : Oliver v.
Smith, 5 Mass. 183; Farmers' Bank v.
Beaston, 7 G. & J. 421.
But after dividend declared, and the
assignee has been directed to pay it over,
it may be garnisheed: Thayer v. Tyler,
5 Alien 94; Dewing v. Wentworth, 11
Cush. 499.
A voluntary assignment of property to
pay debts, not under any statutory proceedings, or under an order of court,
does not protect the property assigned
from legal process in the hands of an
officer: Leeds v. Sayward, 6 N. H. 83;
Ward v. Lamson, 6 Pick. 358 ; Viall v.
Bliss, 9 Id. 13; Brewer v. Pitkin, 11 Id.
298: Copeland v. Weld, 8 Me. 411;
Todd v. Bucknam, 11 Id. 41 ; .Tewett v.
Barnard, 6 Id. 381.
Moxrnr Ir COURT.-Money paid into
court is pre-eminently in. the custody of
the law, and can in no way be interfered
with: Farmers' Bank v. Beaston, 7 G.
& J. 421; Bowden v. Schatzell, Bailey
Eq. 360; Aurrell v. Johnson, 3 Hill
(S. C.) 12; see, however, Dunlop v.
Patterson Pire Ins. Co., 74 N. Y. 145.
PunLic TRnAsunn.-So, money in
the hands of a county treasurer is in custody of the law: Chealy v. Brewer, 7
Mass. 259. (The decision of Jones v.
Gorham, 2 Mass. 375, and Decoster v.
Livermore, 4 Id. 101, are overruled. See
Colby v. Coates, 6 Cush. 558.) Bulkley
v. Eckert, 3 Penn. St. 368; Divine v.
Harvie, 7 Mon. (Ky.) 440; Bank of
Tennessee v. Dibrell, 3 Sneed 379;
Pierson v. McCormick, I Penn. L. J.
ebb v. McCauley, 4 Bush 8;
201 ;

or treasurer of a city : Triebel v. Colburn,
64 Ill. 376.
GOVERNMENT OPPicEns.-Officers
of the United States, acting as disbursing officers, cannot be garnisheed as to
the money in their hands, for such money
is the money of the government so long
as it remains in the officer's hands, and
hence the general rule that a sovereign
state cannot be sued applies to the case :
Buchanan v. Alexander, 4 How. 20;
Dewey v. Garvey, 130 Mass. 86 ; Lodor
v. Baker, 39 N. J. L. 49 ; Edmondson v.
De. Kalb County, 51 Ala. 103; on
grounds of public policy: Pottier 6- Stymus Mfg.Co. v. Taylor, 3 MacA. (D.C.)
4; Brown v. Finley, Ibid. 77; Rollo v.
Indes Ins. Co., 23 Gratt. 509; s. c. 14
Am. Rep. 147.
In New Hampshire, where the garnishee defendant was not a public officer,
but acted only as a town's agent, it was
held that he could be garnisheed: IVendell v. Pierce, 13 N. H. 502.
Thus, imported goods upon which the
duties have not been paid, cannot be
seized on execution : Peck v. Jenness, 7
How. 612; Blarris v. Dennie, 3 Pet.
292.
See Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How.
583; Fisher v. Dandistel, 10 Weekly
Notes Cases 555.
AsnEST.-Where a person was lawfully arrested and valuables were taken
off his person before he was imprisoned,
it was held that such valuables, while in
the hands of the jailor, were liable to attachment: Refsnyder v. Lee, 44 Iowa
101 ; s. c. 24 Am. Rep. 733.
ADMINISTIATOR.-SO, the money of
an estate is in the custody of the law, and
the administrator cannot be held as a
trustee of a creditor of the estate of his
intestate: Brooks v. Cook, 8 Mass. 246 ;
Waite v. Osborne, 11 Me. 185 ; .3farvel
v. Houston, 2 Harr. (Del.) 349 ; Thorn
v. Wfoodruff, 5 Ark. 55 ; Fowler v. MeClelland, Id. 188; Welch v. Gurley, 2
Hay. (N.' C.) 334; Gee v. Warwick, Id.
354; Hancock v. Titus, 39 Miss. 224;
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Selfridge's Appeal, 9 W. & S. 55 ; Suggs
v. Sapp, 20 Geo. 100; Hartle v. Long,
5 Penn. St. 491 ; Bivens v. Harper, 59
Ill.21 ; Conway v. Annington, 11 R. I.
116.
In Mississippi it is governed by statute, and the insolvency of the estate does
not prevent the garnishment : Holman v.
Fisher, 49 Miss. 472.
In Alabama, an administrator may be
charged as garnishee in respect of a debt
due from his testator to the defendant
(Terry v. Lindsay, 3 Stew. &Port. 317),
but not until he is summoned in his representative capacity: Tillinghast v. Johnson, 5 Ala. 514; see, however, Mlock v.
King, 15 Id. 66; 31oore v. Stainton, 22
Id. 834; Jackson v. Shipman, 28 Id.
488.
But in New Hampshire it is held that
where the administrator has been adjudged and ordered, by the proper tribunal to pay a sum certain to a creditor
of the estate, he may be charged as a
garnishee of the party to whom the money
was ordered to be paid.
The court
said: "An administrator, till lie is personally liable to an action in consequence
of his private promise, the settlement of
the estate, some decree against him, or
other cause, cannot be liable to a trustee
process. Because till some such event,
the principal has no ground of action
against him in his private capacity; and
he is bound to account otherwise for the
funds in his hands.
The suit against
him till such an event, is against him in
his representative capacity, and the execution must issue to be levied de bonis
testatoris and not de bonis propriis. But
in the present case, the trustee was liable
in his private capacity to the defendant
for the dividend. The debt had been
liquidated, and a decree of payment
passed. The debt was also due immediately. Execution for it would run
against his own goods, and the trustee
process would introduce neither delay nor
embarrassment in the settlement of the
sstate :" Adams v. Barrett, 2 N. H. 374;

Piper v. Piper, 2 Id. 439.
So in M[issouri, Curling v. Hyde, 10 Mo. 374;
Richards v. Griggs, 16 Id. 416; and in
Delaware, Fitchettv. Dolbee, 3 Har. 267;
but not in Vermont, Parks Y. Hadley, 9
Vt. 320 ; nor in Pennsylvania, Bank of
Chester v. Ralston, 7 Penn. St. 482; Hess
v. Shorb, Id. 231 ; .3fcCrearyv. Toper,
10 Id. 419 ; nor in West Virginia, Parker v. Donnally, 4 W. Va. 648.
EXEoUTOR.-In the early case of
Barnes v. Treat, 7 Mass. 271 (1811), it
was held that an executor cannot be
charged as the trustee of one to whom a
pecuniary legacy is bequeathed by the
will of the testator. By a statute then
in force it was provided that the "goods,
effects and credits intrusted and deposited" in the hands of a stranger were attachable ; and it was held that a money
legacy, in the hands of an executor, was
neither goods nor effects, nor in the proper sense a credit, since the relation of
creditor and debtor did not exist. The
court also stated that the principles which
gdvern the attaching of money in an
officer's hands were applicable to the case
at bar. " In neither case is there a
credit; nor was the subject, attempted to
be attached, intrusted or deposited, in the
srnse of the act, in the hands of a person
summoned as a trustee." This case was
distinguished from preceding cases, which
were decided under a provincial statute.
And as a general proposition an executor cannot he held as a garnishee, in respect of a pecuniary legacy bequeathed
by his testator ; neither in England: Toller on Ex. 478 (4 Am. ed.), nor in
the United States : W1inchell v. Allen, I
Conn. 385 ; Beckwith v. Baxter, 3 N. H.
67 ; Shewell v. Keen, 2 Whart. (Pa.)
332; -Barnett v.Weaver, Id. 418 ; Picquet v. Swan, 4 Mason 443; Deblieuxv.
Hotard, 31 La. Ann. 194 ; Conway v.
Armington, 11 R. I. 116 ; Woodward v.
Woodward, 4 Halst. 115. Contra, Stratton v. Ham,8 lnd. 84; Cummings v. Garvin, 65 Mle. 301 (under a peculiar stat-

E. E. BOLLES CO. v. UNITED STATES.
ute). Stratton v. Ham, has appended to
it a note containing a citation of all the
cases upto that date (1856).
GuAnDxnz .- So it was held in Massachusetts that a guardian cannot be charged
by the trustee process, for the debts of
his ward, upon the ground that the ward's
money, while in the hands of his guardian, was in the custody of the law:
Gassett v. Grout, 4 Met. 486 ; Davis v.
Drew, 6 N. H. 399 ; Vierhdler v. Brutto,
6 Ill. App. 95 ; Hansen v. Butler, 48
Me. 81 ; Perry v. Thornton, 7 R. I. 15;
Godbold v. Bass, 12 Rich. 202. In case
of a guardian of a spendthrift, it is different, and they may be charged as garnishee: Hicks v.Chapman, 10 Allen 463.
CONPLICT BETvEEN STATE AND
F DEIRAL CounTs.-The Supreme Court

of the United States has laid down the
rule that when executions from a state
court and from a court of the United
States are both levied, if there be no lien
by judgment, the one under which a
seizure is first made, must prevail, and
hold the property: Brown v. Clarke, 4
How. 4.
Even where the judgment liens are
equal (Pulliam v. Osborne, 17 How.47 1),
as between a judgment creditor and an
administrator holding under the order of
a probate court of a state (Williams v.
Benedict, 8 Id. 107), 6r in favor of a
receiver holding under the order of the
court of a state and a judgment ered-

itor ( Wiswall v. Sampson, 14 Id. 52), or

a trustee in possession under an order of
court, and such a creditor: Peale v.
Pdpps, Id. 368.
The goods seized on an attachment by
the marshal cannot be taken out of his
possession by a writ of replevin, because
the possession of the marshal is the possession of the court, and pending the litigation no other court of concurrent
jurisdiction is permitted to disturb that
possession: Freeman v. Howe, 24 How.
450; Slocums v. Mlayberry, 2 Wheat. 2 ;
Hammod v. Loan and Trust Co., 105
U. S. 82 ; Kern v. Huidekoper, 103 Id.
491.
But if the marshal wrongfully
seize the goods, the federal courts will not
protect him if a suit for trespass is
brought against him: Budcs v. Colbath,
3 Wall. 334.

Yet if the goods are attached and sold
under an order of court given after the
levy of the attachment writ, being an
adjudication of their liability to sale, the
officer is not liable to the assignee in
bankruptcy of the defendant: Conner v.
Long, 104 U. S. 228 ; Johnson v. Bishop,
1 Woolw. 324; Bradley v. Frost, 3 Dill.
457 ; Duffieldv. Borton, 73 N.Y. 218.
Whiskey in bond, under the control of
a United States officer, is as much in eustody of the law as if in the hands of a
marshal: May v. Hoaglan, 9 Bush 191.
W. W. TnosTo.
Crawfordsville, Ind.

Supreme Court of the United States.
THE E. E. BOLLES WOODEN WARE COMPANY v. THE UNITED
STATES.
In an action for timber cut and carried away from the land of plaintiff, the measure of damages is: (1) Where the defendant is a knowing and wilful trespasser, the
full value of the property at the time and place of demand ; or of suit brought with
no deduction for labor and expense of the defendant. (2) Where the defendant is
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an unintentional or mistaken trespasset, or his innocent vendee, the value at the
time of conversion, less what the labor and expense of defendant and his vendor
have added to its value.
(3) Where defendant is a purchaser, without notice of
wrong, from a wilful trespasser, the value at the time of such purchase.

THIs was a writ of error to the Circuit Court for the Eastern
District of Wisconsin, founded on a certificate of division of opinion
between the judges holding that court.
The facts, as certified, out of which this difference of opinion
arose appear in an action, in the nature of trover, brought by the
United States for the value of 242 cords of ash timber, or wood
suitable for manufacturing purposes, cut and removed from that
part of the public lands known as -the reservation of the Oneida
tribe of Indians, in the state of Wisconsin. This timber was knowingly and wrongfully taken from the land by Indians, and carried
by them some distance to the town of Depere, and there sold to the
defendant, which was not chargeable with any intentional wrong or
misconduct or bad faith in the purchase.
The timber on the ground, after it was felled, was worth twentyfive cents per cord, or $60.71 for the whole, and at the town of
Depere, where defendant bought and received it, $3.50 per cord,
or $850 for the whole quantity. The question on which the judges
divided was whether the liability of the defendant should be measured by the first or the last of these valuations.
It was the opinion of the circuit judge' that the latter was the
proper rule of damages, and.judgment was rendered against the
defendant for that sum. Defendant then took this writ of error.
The opinion of the court -was delivered by
MILLER, J.-We cannot follow counsel for the plaintiff in error
through the examination of all the cases, both in England and this
country, which his commendable research has enabled him to place
upon the brief. In the English courts the decisions have in the
main grown out of coal taken from the mine, and in such cases the
principle seems to be established in those courts, that when suit is
brought for the value of the coal so taken, and- it has been the
result of an honest mistake as to the true ownership of the mine,
and the taking was not a wilful trespass, the rule*of damages is the
value of the coal as it was in the mine before it was disturbed, and
not its value when dug out and delivered at the mouth of the mine:
Ziartin v. Porter,5 Meeson & Welsby 351; M2lorgan v. Powell, 3
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Ad. & E. (N. S.) 218; Wood v. Biorewood, .9 Id. 440; Hilton v.
Woods, L. R., 4 Eq. 438; Jegon v. Vivian, L. R., 6 Chancery
760.
• The doctrine of the English courts on this subject is probably
as well stated by Lord HATHERLY, in the House of Lords, in the
case of Livington v. .Rawyards Goal Co., L. R., 5 App. Cas. 33,
as anywhere else. He said: "There is no doubt that if a man
furtively, and in bad faith, robs his neighbor of his property, and
because it is underground is probably for some little time not detected, the court of equity in this country will struggle, or I would
rather say, will assert its authority to punish the fraud by fixing
the person with the value of the whole of the property which he
has so furtively taken, and making him no allowance in respect of
what he has so done, as would have been justly made to him if the
parties had been working by agreement." But "when once we
arrive at the fact that an inadvertence has been the cause of the
misfortune, then the simple course is to make every just allowance
for outlay on the part of the person who has so acquired the property,
and to give back to the owner, so far as is possible under the circumstances of the case, the full value of that which cannot be
restored to him in specie."
There seems to us to be no doubt that in the case of a wilful
trespass the rule as stated above is the law of damages both in England and in this country, though in some of the state courts the
milder rule has been applied even to this class of cases. Such are
some that are cited from Wisconsin: Singlo v. Schneider, 24 Wis.
R. 299; Weymouth v. Railroad Co., 17 Id. 550.
On the other hand, the weight of authority in this country as
well as in England favors the doctrine that where the trespass is
the result of inadvertence or mistake, and the wrong was not intentional, the value of the property when first taken must govern, or
if the conversion sued for was after value had been added to it by
the work of the defendant, he should be credited with this addition.
Winchester v. Craig, 33 Mich. 205, contains a full examination
of the authorities on the point: Heard v. James, 49 Miss. 286 ;
Baker v. T1'heeler, 8 Wendell 505; Baldwin v. Porter, 12 Conn.
484.
While these principles are sufficient to enable us to fix a measure
of damages in both classes of torts where the original trespasser is
defendant, there remains a third class where a purchaser from him
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is sued, as in this case, for the conversion of the property to his
own use. In such case, if the first taker of the property were
guilty of no wilful wrong, the rule can in no case be more stringent against the defendant who purchased of him than against his
vendor.
But the case before us is one where, by reason of the wilful
wrong of the party who committed the trespass, he was liable, under
the rule we have supposed to be established, for the value of the
timber at Depere the moment before he sold it, and the question to
be decided is whether the defendant who purchased it then with no
notice that the property belonged to the United States, and with
no intention to do wrong, must respond by the same rule of damages
as his vendor should if he had been sued.
It seems to us that he must. The timber at all stages of the
conversion was the property of plaintiff. Its purchase by defendant did not divest the title nor the right of possession. The recovery of any sum whatever is based upon that proposition. This
right, at the moment preceding the purchase by defendant at
Depere, was perfect, with no right in any one to set up a claim for
work and labor bestowed on it by the wrongdoer. It is also plain
that by purchase from the wrongdoer defendant did not acquire any
better title to the property than his vendor had. It is not a case
where an innocent purchaser can defend himself under that plea.
If it were, he would be liable to no damages at all, and no recovery could be had. On the contrary, it is a case to which the doctrine of caveat emptor applies, and hence the right of recovery in
plaintiff.
On what ground then can it be maintained that the right to
recover against him should not be just what it was against his vendor the moment before he interfered and acquired possession ? If
the case were one which concerned additional value placed upon the
property by the work or labor of the defendant after he had purchased, the same rule might be applied as in case of the inadvertent
trespasser.
But here he has added nothing to its value. He acquired possession of property of the United States at Depere, which, at that
place, and in its then condition, is worth $850, and he wants to
satisfy the claim of the government by the payment of $60. He
founds his right to do this, not on the ground that anything he
has added to the property has increased its value by the amount
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of the difference between these two sums, but on the proposition
that in purchasing the property, he purchased of the wrongdoer
a right to deduct what the labor of the latter had added to its
value.
If, as in the case of an unintentional trespasser, such right existed, of course defendant would have bought it and stood in his
shoes ; but, as in the present case, of an intentional trespas~er, who
had no such right to sell, the defendant could purchase none.
Such is the distinction taken in the Roman law as stated in the
Institutes of Justinian, Lib. II., Title I., sect. 34.
After speaking of a painting by one man on the tablet of another,
and holding it to be absurd that the work of an Appelles or Parrhasius should go without compensation to the owner of a worthless
tablet, if the painter had possession fairly, he says, as translated
by Dr. Cooper: "But if he, or any other, shall have taken away
the tablet feloniously, it is evident the owner may prosecute by
action of theft."
The case of Nesbitt v. St. Paul Lumber Co., 21 Minn. 491, is
directly in point here. The Supreme Court of Minnesota says:
"The defendant claims that because they (the logs) were enhanced
in value by the labor of the original wrongdoer in cutting them,
and the expense of transporting them to Anoka, the plaintiff is not
entitled to recover the enhanced value, that is, that he is not entitled to recover the full value at the time and place of conversion."
That was a case, like this, where the defendant was the innocent
purchaser of the logs from the wilful wrongdoer, and where, as in
this case, the transportation of them to a market was the largest
item in their value at the time of conversion by defendant; but the
court overruled the proposition and affirmed a judgment for the
value at Anoka, the place of sale.
To establish any other principle in such a case as this would be
very disastrous to the interest of the public in the immense forest
lands of the government. It has long been a matter of complaint
that the depredations upon these lands are rapidly destroying the
finest forests in the world. Unlike the individual owner who, by
fencing and vigilant attention, can protect his valuable trees, the
government has no adequate defence against this great evil. Its
liberality in allowing trees to be cut on its land for mining, agricultural and other specified uses, has been used to screen the lawless depredator who destroys and sells for profit.
VOL. XXI.--86

